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To cite this article: Burhanuddin Muhtadi (2015) Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 51:3, 349-368, DOI: 10.1080/00074918.2015.1110684

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2015.1110684

Published online: 29 Nov 2015.
Indonesian Politics in 2015

JOKOWI’S FIRST YEAR: A WEAK PRESIDENT CAUGHT BETWEEN REFORM AND OLIGARCHIC POLITICS

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When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia’s respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anti-corruption and human-rights issues, for example—in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia’s political life and promote the interests of Indonesia’s elite.

Keywords: oligarchic politics, party cartels, coalition, political parties, presidency, cabinet

JEL classification: D72, D73

INTRODUCTION

When Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was inaugurated as president of Indonesia on 20 October 2014, he promised to bring a new style to Indonesian politics, thereby generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Expectations for reform were high because, unlike Indonesia’s previous presidents, Jokowi came from outside the Jakarta power structures, did not have a military background, and had no ties to established or influential families. He was instead seen as a product of reformasi, having risen to political prominence in a decentralised Indonesia that held direct local elections. While campaigning, Jokowi introduced a new style of participatory politics; he

* I would like to thank Edward Aspinall for his detailed comments and helpful advice on the draft. My thanks also go to Marcus Mietzner, Greg Fealy, Peter McCawley, Pierre van der Eng, Allison Ley, and the editors for their constructive feedback. Thanks also to Eve Warburton for her role as discussant at the 2015 Indonesia Update conference.
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climbed to the top of the pyramid by attracting a vast network of enthusiastic and politically independent volunteers, including anti-corruption and human-rights activists. His victory over Prabowo Subianto, a Soeharto-era general with a reputation for brutality, was deemed a victory for democracy, a decisive break from Indonesia’s old guard. In October 2014, Jokowi appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine, with the headline ‘A New Hope’, which pointed to a potentially new chapter in Indonesian democracy.

Against this popular perception of renewed faith in democracy, it took only a few months in office for the Jokowi administration to produce some elements of democratic regression, amid rising public disappointment. Jokowi placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding the nomination of senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by police and others to weaken Indonesia’s respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). There was subsequently a dramatic change of tone in the public discussion of Indonesian politics. Jokowi began his term with a reputation as a highly successful local representative, a corruption-free, hands-on public manager, and one of a new generation of leaders who had no apparent links to the political establishment. Yet he soon fell into the lowlands of old politics, and is now seen by many as a business-as-usual politician who engages in promiscuous power-sharing and backroom manoeuvres. So what went wrong for Jokowi, in whom so much hope was invested?

For one, a number of personal factors prevented him from delivering on his bold promises of first-year reform. From the beginning, for example, he did not show the leadership qualities necessary to tackle corruption and human-rights violations. His focus on economic development drove his agenda; he was primarily pragmatic and domestically focused, and concerned about concrete policies at the expense of abstract concepts. He seemed to believe that Indonesia’s crackdown on corruption had discouraged some local and national officials from starting new projects and had instilled fear in others that they would be accused of, or even charged with, corruption. Hopes that Jokowi’s election would jump-start democratic reform were misplaced.

Structural factors also inhibited democratic progress. Jokowi is far from immune to external pressures, particularly the presence of oligarchic forces that dominate Indonesia’s political life and fuse the business and political interests of Indonesia’s elite. When the election ended, politics shifted from the volunteers and voting masses back to the elites. Jokowi’s distinctly non-elite background played a key role in his winning the election and being hailed as the people’s president, yet it has kept him out of the oligarchic club that has defined Indonesian politics for decades. His outsider status also created implausible expectations that he could overhaul the transactional nature of Indonesian politics. In reality, as a political outsider who relied primarily on a small coalition in an opposition-dominated parliament, Jokowi desperately needed political support from leading party oligarchs to govern effectively. As a result, he embraced the old-style politics of horse-trading for prominent posts in the cabinet and other high-ranking positions. Then again, the structural factors of post-Soeharto politics in Indonesia would make it hard for any president to assemble a non-collusive government and push through far-reaching reforms.
OLIGARCHS, CARTELS, AND THE FAILINGS OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM

Attempts to explain the problems and failings of democratic reform in the post-Soeharto era tend to rely on either the oligarchy thesis, which stresses material power, or the cartelisation thesis, which emphasises political institutions. The oligarchy thesis asserts that, despite the consolidation of democracy since 1998, the post-authoritarian government is still controlled by the oligarchic and predatory forces that have defined the country’s politics for decades (Hadiz and Robison 2013). The cartel thesis, on the other hand, claims that contemporary Indonesian politics is dominated by party cartels, in which a wide spectrum of political parties collude to enjoy the spoils of power (Slater 2004; Ambardi 2008).

In this article, I consider whether these theories help to explain the experiences of Jokowi’s government to date. Jokowi’s ascendency to the presidency was partly a result of oligarchic support for his campaign, thereby making it hard for him to escape his obligations to oligarchs after assuming the administration. Alternatively, Jokowi’s victory could be considered a decisive break from the old oligarchic forces, since his rise to political prominence was not the oligarchs’ choice and he is not a member of the oligarchic club (Mietzner 2015, 58). Was Jokowi’s first year in office a victory for oligarchic forces, with Jokowi simply a puppet of predatory elites? Or does he still represent a serious challenge to them? In the three months between Jokowi’s electoral victory and the formation of his cabinet, there was evidence that the cartel system that has defined Indonesian politics since the outset of *reformasi* was finally dead. Jokowi came to power after an election that was deeply divisive, not only at the grass roots but also at the elite level. A solid opposition bloc emerged, arguably the first in the post-Soeharto period, and Jokowi kept his pledge to build a government upon what he intriguingly called *koalisi ramping* (a slim coalition), rather than a giant political cartel. So does Indonesia under the Jokowi administration contradict the cartel thesis? Or are there signs that Jokowi will ultimately fall into a collusive trap of cartelist rule?

The concept of oligarchy has played a prominent role in literature on Indonesian politics since the advent of democracy in the country in 1998. Early proponents of the concept emphasised the primacy of material power in Indonesian politics. The oligarchy model has been advocated by, and largely associated with, three major scholars of Indonesian politics: Richard Robison, Vedi Hadiz, and Jeffrey Winters. Their influential works—Robison and Hadiz’s *Reorganising Power: The Politics of Oligarchy in the Age of Markets* (2004) and Winters’s *Oligarchy* (2011)—share a framework that focuses exclusively on material wealth as the most potent and effective determinant of political outcomes. Under their influence, the notion of oligarchy has increasingly come to be used by political observers and journalists in Indonesia and elsewhere to depict the primacy of material resources and capital accumulation in maintaining or pursuing political and economic power. The oligarchy idea has also been widely discussed in the Indonesian mass media. It received much non-scholarly attention soon after the post-2004 reforms that introduced direct elections for the presidency and regional-head positions, with many arguing that democracy was being largely driven by money politics and had opened the door for oligarchs to control electoral politics.1

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1. See, for example, articles by Lubis (2015) and Airlangga (2014).
Regardless of their commonalities in characterising the nature of oligarchy in contemporary Indonesian politics, Robison, Hadiz, and Winters depart from different theoretical starting points (Ford and Pepinsky 2013, 4). Robison and Hadiz draw primarily on neo-Marxist thought and offer a more structural conceptualisation in which they define oligarchy as ‘a system of power relations that enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense’ (Hadiz and Robison 2014, 35). Winters’s analysis centres on the role of actors, making his framework a more Weberian concern (Ford and Pepinsky 2013, 4). Winters describes oligarchy as a ‘politics of wealth defense among materially endowed actors’ (2011, 7). For him, oligarchs are actors who, because of the extreme concentration of wealth in their hands, ‘are empowered by that wealth—a power resource that stands out among the other forms’ (2013, 14).

Winters joins with Robison and Hadiz, however, in describing the opportunistic mobility and flexibility of oligarchic power in post-Soeharto Indonesia. The three main proponents of the thesis argue that oligarchy and democracy can go together. As Hadiz and Robison (2013, 38) put it, ‘democracy has not undermined the oligarchy that emerged under the New Order, although the theory does acknowledge that Indonesia’s dominant elite has been forced to sustain its ascendancy in different ways’. For most oligarchy theorists, there is nothing special about the post-authoritarian polity, since the essence of political life remains unchanged. One of this proposition’s most controversial points is that ‘real change cannot be achieved so long as the social order of the previous regime and its ascendant political forces remain intact and in charge of the state. . . . Incremental demands for reform by individuals or groups can only be piecemeal if they do not achieve a broader political ascendancy and control over the state’ (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 55). Power resources that have defined political power for a long time remain concentrated in the hands of old players, while new players are sucked into the same predatory practices. Accordingly, Winters claims that the current democratic regimes in Indonesia are best defined as an ‘untamed ruling oligarchy’ (2011, 181).

In short, the three main proponents of this theory propose a similar conclusion, that ‘the power of wealthy actors and their political associates in Indonesia is so strong that no substantial reform can occur without oligarchic approval’ (Mietzner 2015, 6). This suggests that no Indonesian can successfully escape from oligarchic rule. According to most oligarchy theorists, the rise of a politician to the apex of Indonesian political power requires the endorsement of oligarchs.

The second main framework explaining how Indonesian politics has worked since the post-Soeharto era is the so-called cartel thesis, which includes the notion that parties tend to work together in a collusive manner to capture state patronage. Katz and Mair (2009) outline the key elements of this thesis:

The cartel party is a type that is postulated to emerge in democratic politics that are characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion. . . . Competition between cartel parties focuses less on differences in policy and more on provision of spectacle, image, and theater (755).

Slater (2004) was the first to apply the cartel thesis to Indonesia. Describing the genesis of the political cartel soon after the 1999 election, he argued that instead of maintaining political competition, Indonesian parties formed an expansive cartel that drew in potentially oppositional forces—as evidenced by the formation
of ‘rainbow’ coalitions that included all significant political parties under presidents Megawati (2001–4) and Yudhoyono (2004–14). According to the cartelisation model, political parties ignore election results, collectively dismiss their ideological and programmatic stances, and fall in with the government for the sake of capturing state patronage. As the collusion of politicians functions as the fundamental driver of Indonesian political behaviour and parties share a common interest in enjoying the spoils of office, they become disengaged from society. Ultimately, the political system becomes caught up in what Slater calls the ‘accountability trap’, owing to the failure of political parties to establish checks and balances at the governmental level. Slater and Simmons (2013) developed the cartel model further, introducing the term ‘promiscuous powersharing’ to describe the behaviour of party cartels.

Ambardi (2008) proposes a similar argument but distinguishes the sources and arenas of competition and cartelisation. While acknowledging that competition occurs among political parties during elections, Ambardi contends that a political competition seems to dissolve after campaigns finish, when political parties are more likely to emphasise the sharing of the state executive’s bounteous patronage resources. According to the cartelisation camp, the system of party cartels provides a stable collusive agreement among political parties and their elites to avoid societal tensions that can be seen as a threat to governability. In brief, the core features of analyses of Indonesia using the cartelisation model are as follows: party ideology is unimportant in determining coalitions, political competition occurs only during elections, and there is no significant opposition in parliament.

These theories explain in different ways the problems and failings of reform in post-Soharto Indonesia. According to the oligarchy paradigm, the interests of the wealthy in sabotaging reform is key; for cartelisation scholars, the root problem is promiscuous power-sharing. Unlike most oligarchy theorists, who focus on structural conditions, proponents of the cartelisation model put greater emphasis on political institutions. Here, I treat these theoretical approaches as conflicting ways of examining Jokowi’s first year in office.

THE DEATH OF THE RULING CARTEL?
Proponents of the oligarchy and cartel interpretations of Indonesian politics examined Jokowi’s spectacular rise to the presidency from the outset. Hadiz’s (2014) claim that the presidential election merely continued on from previous elections rather than marking a significant change is an example of how gloomy oligarchy theorists’ views can be on the future of Indonesia. Unlike many foreign and domestic observers and activists who saw Jokowi’s victory as a decisive break with the old guard, Hadiz contended that Jokowi and Prabowo were not fundamentally different, characterising the former as a puppet of the oligarchs who control Indonesia. Meanwhile, Slater (2014), the main proponent of the cartelisation theory, suggested that, despite Jokowi’s promises, parties and elites would be unlikely to stop engaging in cartelistic politics. For Slater, ‘promiscuous powersharing rather than ideologically defined powersharing has been the rule since reformasi’, and the prospects of party cartels would be determined not only on election day but also during negotiations on the formation of government.

The prospect that Jokowi would diminish party cartelisation was greater, however, than the likelihood that he would challenge oligarchic dominance. Unlike
Prabowo, who during his campaign formed powerful and big alliances—*koalisi tenda besar* (a big-tent coalition)—and made many promises of cabinet positions, Jokowi climbed to the apex of political power while remaining somewhat less beholden to the party cartels. There were, at a minimum, five grounds for optimism that Jokowi would confound the expectations of cartelisation theory. First, rather than building an expansive coalition to campaign for him during the presidential elections, Jokowi instead formed a limited coalition, *Koalisi Indonesia Hebat* (KIH), or Great Indonesia Coalition, which consisted only of PDI–P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), NasDem (National Democrats), PKB (National Awakening Party), and Hanura (People’s Conscience Party). This coalition held only 37% of the seats in the People’s Representative Council (DPR) elected in April 2014, whereas Prabowo’s coalition held 63%.

Second, Jokowi promised no rewards in return for the support he received from parties or elites, and emphasised that he was building a coalition with no strings attached (*tanpa syarat*). Third, before his inauguration, Jokowi had put himself in a bind by promising to reduce the number of ministries in his upcoming cabinet. He also promised that his cabinet would be dominated by non-partisan professionals. These promises increased already high expectations that Jokowi would usher in a new chapter in Indonesian politics. People thought Jokowi would be different from other politicians, owing to his reputation as a highly successful local leader, free from corruption, and his persona as a ‘man of the people’—a real reformer with no ties to old politics. Given the challenges from the powerful interests that shape Indonesian politics, however, managing such high public expectations was no less hard for Jokowi.

Fourth, contrary to the usual cartelistic practices in Indonesia, the 2014 presidential election drew a sharper line between the ruling parties and the opposition. Previously, when the elections ended, political parties in Indonesia would abandon their hostilities, ignore the election results, and fall in line with the government. In contrast, the atmosphere of political polarisation between Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s supporters persisted. After being sworn in, Jokowi led a limited coalition supported by parties with a minority of the seats in the parliament, which was controlled by an opposing coalition led by his rivals Prabowo and Aburizal Bakrie. Fifth, Jokowi stated that his new cabinet, once formed, would be known as Kabinet Kerja (Working Cabinet), symbolising his anti-cartelist approach. This name contrasts with those of Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Unity Cabinet, Megawati’s Mutual Assistance Cabinet, and Yudhoyono’s United Indonesia Cabinet, whose names emphasised their broad-based coalitions. Unsurprisingly, Jokowi was widely expected to open the door to a dramatically different sort of politics, in which the opposition would be invited to play a constructive function as a constitutional check on the government. Moreover, that Jokowi was able to take advantage of his honeymoon period as the new president reflected the public’s high degree of trust in him (75%) (SMRC 2014).

Jokowi’s victory disrupted markedly the cosy environment of cartelised politics, but events soon showed that cartelisation was not yet dead. Promiscuous

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2. As the front-runner for the presidential election, Jokowi was approached by various parties about forming alliances, with the aim of providing his running mate or simply being included in his upcoming cabinet.
power-sharing was being reconstituted—not by the winning side but, unusually, by the losing side. This does not entirely support the literature on political cartels: in theory, a cartelised political system occurs when an election fails to produce a clear opposition and when ‘every single significant party gains a share of executive power through appointments to the cabinet’ (Slater and Simmons 2013, 1371). Jokowi had assembled a slim coalition that, for the first time in Indonesia, led to the emergence of a cohesive and confrontational opposition. Hence, I use the term ‘collusive opposition’ to refer to a dominant parliamentary opposition that relies on promiscuous power-sharing to bind its loyalties.

Disappointed by Jokowi’s refusal to promise cabinet positions to those in opposing parties who tried to switch sides after the election, Prabowo ‘drew his strength from an alliance of parties and leaders that feared politico-economic marginalisation under the Jokowi administration’ (Mietzner 2015, 50). Supported by Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party, Prabowo’s Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP), or Red-and-White Coalition, significantly outnumbered the ruling coalition in the DPR. The Democratic Party was not officially a member of KMP, but Yudhoyono was frustrated that Jokowi, who ran for president under the banner of Megawati’s PDI–P, had cold-shouldered him when looking for a possible coalition before the presidential election. The well-known animosity between Megawati and Yudhoyono, and Jokowi’s relative political dependence on PDI–P, gave Jokowi little leeway to ally with the Democratic Party.

The most compelling evidence of the collusive opposition initiated by Prabowo’s coalition in parliament was his move in September 2014 to eliminate direct local elections.3 Prabowo clearly attempted to install a form of collusive democracy in the regions—in which local-government leadership positions would be allocated by party coalitions in the regional legislatures—while Jokowi, with his small coalition, defended the right of people to choose their regional leaders. Rather than listening to the will of the people, 92% of whom supported direct local elections (according to the Indonesian Survey Institute’s finding in December 2013), KMP looked to reinstate the election of regional heads by local parliaments, considering it a far more promising way to control local politics. Aside from KMP’s domination in the national parliament, it commanded approximately 60% of the seats in local parliaments nationwide (LSI 2014), making it much easier for Prabowo’s coalition to secure victory in local government elections by using indirect mechanisms rather than having to control the entire population in a direct election. Under KMP’s plan, elections would be over before they started, and much of local politics would take place outside the public domain, driven by intra-elite negotiations over power-sharing arrangements.

There could have been grave consequences for political stability had regional heads controlled by the opposition been able to challenge the Jokowi government en bloc by disregarding national policies. According to one prominent figure in

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3. Direct local elections have been in place since 2004, but the Yudhoyono government and parliament had been deliberating a regional election bill since 2007. The government and most parties, including Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party), Golkar, and other members of KMP, had agreed that a new local election would maintain the right of people to vote for their local leaders. But they changed their mind after PDI–P and Jokowi won the 2014 legislative and presidential elections.
KMP, ‘We will let Jokowi be president, but we will control the regions. All governors, head of districts, and mayors would be ours’ (pers. comm., Jakarta, 12 Sept. 2014). The former minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja argued that the only people to benefit would be oligarchs and (cartel) elites, because parliaments and parties would simply appoint their friends (Sydney Morning Herald, 26 Sept. 2014). KMP, which held a majority in the DPR, endorsed a bill abolishing direct local elections on 26 September 2014, a few weeks before Jokowi’s inauguration. Yudhoyono’s party, which controlled 148 of 560 seats in the old parliament, walked out of the deliberations, enabling the bill to be passed. After suffering from a barrage of complaints from the public, however, Yudhoyono issued an emergency presidential decree in early October 2014 to overturn the controversial bill and restore direct regional elections. Prabowo’s coalition vowed to vote down this decree in parliament. But, according to Yudhoyono, after he ‘threatened to form a long-term alliance with Jokowi, they grudgingly relented and accepted the resurrection of direct polls’ (Mietzner 2015, 49).

More evidence that Prabowo’s coalition acted collusively included its legislative initiative to pass surreptitious amendments to Law 27/2009 on Legislative Institutions (better known as the MD3 law) on 8 July 2014, just a day before the presidential election. Changing the rules allowed KMP to take control of the legislature by capturing the speakership of parliaments (at the national and regional levels) and the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). As stipulated by the amended law, the control of a legislature’s speakership should be decided by a members’ vote based on the package system (satu paket), which requires each faction to nominate four candidates from different factions, rather than by the party with the most seats. After the new DPR was sworn in on 1 October 2014, a plenary meeting was held to select the House speaker. Realising that the Prabowo camp had by far the most numbers in parliament at the time, the Jokowi–Kalla camp chose to walk out of the vote, allowing Prabowo’s coalition to make a clean sweep of the House speakerships. The package system was also implemented in the plenary meeting to elect the MPR speaker, and ended with the victory of Zulkifli Hasan (nominated by Prabowo’s camp). The Prabowo coalition’s next salvo came on 29 October 2014, when it won every leadership position in eleven parliamentary commissions and five other bodies without accommodating representatives from the Jokowi coalition (Today, 31 Oct. 2014). Leadership positions in the House’s commissions are not merely administrative (Ambardi 2008); they also provide patronage opportunities, as Slater (2004, 90) explains:

> For one, the old assumption that the cabinet is generally basah, while parliament is relatively kering, appears no longer to ring true. To be left in the parliament does not mean being left out of highly lucrative patronage networks. This suggests that

4. Cabinet seats are universally assumed to be more basah (wet) than parliament seats because ministers have direct access to far more luxurious patronage resources. Parliament is assumed to be more kering (dry) because it deals only with budgeting, not with executing lucrative budgets. This does not necessarily mean, however, that rent activities do not take place in parliament. Among party legislators and the press, labels such as komisi basah and komisi kering (wet and dry commissions, respectively) are popular in discussions of whether a commission provides access to bounteous patronage resources (Ambardi 2008).
even if the next president manages to exclude major parties from the next cabinet, the wounds may be salved by helping arrange plum positions on parliamentary commissions.

Above all, the main implication of the amended law was that PDI–P, despite being the plurality winner of the election, with 109 seats in the DPR, gained no representation in either the parliament speakerships or the commission leadership. Disappointed by this unfairness, KIH boycotted all parliamentary sessions from October to November 2014 and appointed its own parliamentary leaders in order to split the DPR. Jokowi quietly instructed his cabinet ministers to boycott invitations from the side of the DPR controlled by Prabowo’s coalition; this boycott ensured that the parliament could not pass laws, which require executive approval. After going through some reconciliatory moves and face-saving mechanisms, a compromise was reached in November 2014 by providing 16 new vice-chair positions of 11 commissions and five other bodies to accommodate Jokowi’s coalition (Kompas, 17 Nov. 2014).

JOKOWI’S TRIPLE-MINORITY POSITION AND THE ENEMY WITHIN
Jokowi’s first challenge after assuming the presidency was to form a cabinet that would uphold meritocracy, something he had repeatedly promised. Previously, Jokowi had pledged that he would not run a ‘transactional’ cabinet, vowing not to fall into the usual practice of trading cabinet posts for support. He also tried to impress the public by inviting the KPK and the PPATK (Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) to vet the nominees. He even crowdsourced his cabinet, by conducting an online survey asking ordinary citizens to propose candidates and by inviting his volunteers and the media to participate in selecting ministers. Excitement and optimism after Jokowi’s election victory led to implausible hopes that he would overhaul Indonesia’s schismatic realpolitik.

The political reality was, however, much trickier. Politicians often propose grand schemes when campaigning for office but end up governing according to the pressures of realpolitik. Moreover, Jokowi was already in a ‘triple minority’ position: he was supported by a government coalition that did not have a parliamentary majority; he was a marginal figure in his own party, with less party authority than previous presidents such as Yudhoyono, Megawati, and Abdurrahman Wahid; and he was very much a newcomer to the national stage.

These limitations ultimately pushed Jokowi to reward the main political parties and oligarchs who had supported him in his efforts to become president. His running mate, Jusuf Kalla, one of Indonesia’s most prominent indigenous (pribumi) oligarchs, a long-time Golkar stalwart and major financial contributor to the Jokowi campaign, expressed his disagreement over the crowdsourcing approach. He reportedly said that ‘if you are given a mandate by the people, do not give it

5. As former New York governor Mario Cuomo put it, ‘We campaign in poetry, but when we’re elected we’re forced to govern in prose’ (New York Times, 16 Feb. 1985).

6. I have borrowed the term ‘triple minority’, as it relates to Jokowi, from Djyadi Hanan (Jakarta Post, 15 Feb. 2015).
back to them. Calling on the public to pick cabinet would be a terrible nuisance (pers. comm., 22 Oct. 2014). He also opposed Jokowi’s promise to form a slimmer, more efficient cabinet by reducing the number of ministerial posts, arguing that the format would make power-sharing difficult. This is not to mention Megawati, who had a huge influence in selecting most of his cabinet; Surya Paloh (a wealthy businessman and head of the NasDem party), who emerged as Jokowi’s second-most powerful patron after Megawati; and other minor stakeholders in the winning coalition. After being sworn in as the president, on 20 October 2014, Jokowi postponed the planned cabinet announcement on 22 October, which had been expected to take place at Tanjung Priok port, in North Jakarta. The delay sparked speculation about what was going on behind the scenes.

When he finally announced his cabinet, on 26 October, its composition showed that he had had to make compromises with his backers. During the campaign, Prabowo had repeatedly warned against electing a ‘puppet’ president, suggesting that Jokowi was little more than a president-for-hire who would be tightly controlled by his political backers, especially Megawati. The line-up of Jokowi’s cabinet confirmed such accusations. Although Jokowi named it the Working Cabinet, many political observers mocked it as a cabinet of compromises, enabling the puppet-president issue to gain prominence once more. To keep his minority coalition together, Jokowi had to include 15 political-party appointees in a cabinet of 34. For instance, Puan Maharani, Megawati’s daughter and PDI–P heir apparent, was appointed coordinating minister of human development and culture. PKB secured four ministerial positions, NasDem three, and Hanura two. Prabowo’s coalition, which consists of at least four political parties, and the Democratic Party, which remains neutral (and together control 63% of seats in the DPR) were not represented in the cabinet (table 1).

In addition, Jokowi appointed several ministers who were professionals, ex-military members, or bureaucrats who were not officially affiliated with any political party but were cronies of party grandees within KIH. Ryamizard Ryacudu, for example, whose appointment as defence minister was widely seen as setback, because it broke from the tradition of civilian rule within the Defence Ministry, is Megawati’s confidante. Sofyan Djalil, Jusuf Kalla’s protégé, was appointed coordinating minister for economic affairs and, later, was moved to minister in charge of the National Development Planning Agency, in the cabinet shake-up in August. For anyone familiar with Indonesia’s traditions of realpolitik, there was little that was surprising in the cabinet’s composition. But, as Aspinall (2014) suggested, it was ‘surprising just how far Jokowi has gone in making these compromises’. People understand that Jokowi is a politician, but they also expected that he would be able to strike a balance between realpolitik and reform without upsetting the volunteer base that brought him to power.

7. In order to get political support from PPP (United Development Party), Jokowi appointed Lukman H. Saifuddin minister of religious affairs, despite frictions in PPP between pro-Jokowi and pro-Prabowo factions. PPP is still embroiled in a long-running dispute over its leadership, and it cannot join the ruling coalition until a final and binding court decision resolves the matter. Saifuddin was largely seen as a representative from the pro-Jokowi faction within the party, but the pro-Prabowo camp denied the claim that his appointment changed the party’s direction to supporting the government.
Jokowi’s First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

Breaking with post-Soeharto traditions, Jokowi did not look to increase the size of his coalition by offering seats in the cabinet to parties that had not supported him in the election. By not doing so, he suffered a double loss. First, he lost the opportunity to establish a ‘minimum winning coalition’, which would contain just enough numbers to dominate the parliament and help him realise his legislative agenda. Second, by granting 15 cabinet posts to political parties that had supported him, as well as accommodating a number of ex-military or technocrats promoted by party oligarchs, Jokowi paid a high price for the political support provided by his coalition, despite that coalition’s lacking a parliamentary majority. Jokowi’s 15 transactional appointments gave him the support of less than 40% of the parliament. Yudhoyono, in contrast, appointed 18 politicians to ministerial posts and received 75% of parliamentary support in return.

Jokowi’s modest legislative support gave him little room for political manoeuvring. With only a minimal coalition in hand, Jokowi needed to find other ways to gain the support needed to secure parliament. After the cabinet announcement, Jokowi seemed to depend more on Kalla, Megawati, and Paloh, as evidenced by the Budi Gunawan case and the weakening of Indonesia’s anti-graft body, the KPK. Maintaining a core of solid coalitional partners is neither easy nor cheap, and Jokowi became tied to a range of his allies’ vested interests that later damaged his government. In order to retain the loyalty of his coalition parties, he not only appointed their cadres in the cabinet but leading party oligarchs were also granted greater access to burgeoning patronage opportunities. Paloh, for example, had three ministerial candidates approved before the cabinet reshuffle in August 2015 and his protégé Prasetyo appointed attorney-general. Paloh was also behind a dubious energy deal to import fuel from Angola in the early weeks of the new administration, an example of a typically oligarchic concession. Little wonder that just three months into Jokowi’s presidency, Indonesia’s leading English-language newspaper published the headline ‘Jokowi: A Hostage of His Own Alliance’, suggesting that the main dangers Jokowi faced were internal to his own coalition (Jakarta Post, 30 Jan. 2015).

In brief, the cabinet line-up provided more evidence for the oligarchy thesis than for the cartel thesis. The cabinet selections did not meet Slater and Simmons’s (2013, 1371) strict definition of cartelisation, because a number of significant political parties – indeed, a majority – were overlooked. Even the cabinet shake-up in August, in which Jokowi replaced only key economic ministers, produced no

8. This is in line with Groseclose and Snyder’s (1996, 304) theory on buying supermajorities: an oversize coalition is generally cheaper when the costs of maintaining a winning coalition are taken into account.
evidence for a party cartel, because Jokowi still relied on a small coalition. In general, however, the cabinet make-up clearly served the interests of party oligarchs within the ruling coalition.

JOKOWI AMONG THE OLIGARCHS

Jokowi’s position under the thumb of his own alliance was on display in early January 2015, when he nominated Megawati’s former adjutant Budi Gunawan as police chief. It seems that the president nominated Budi to appease Megawati, given that he had earlier refused to include him in the cabinet. The nomination of Budi, who in 2010 faced allegations of dubious transactions in his bank accounts, soon became a scandal that quickly ended Jokowi’s political honeymoon. Just one day before Budi was to be confirmed as the new police chief, the KPK announced that it suspected him of holding dubious bank deposits when he was the chief of the police’s bureau of human resources. Yet Kalla and Paloh forced Jokowi to overlook the indictment and move to inaugurate Budi as police chief after securing parliament’s approval.

Facing the prospect of rapidly losing both his popularity and his image as a clean anti-corruption figure, Jokowi cancelled Budi’s inauguration on 18 February. Yet this was only the beginning of the political drama. The unexpected nomination had escalated tensions between the KPK and the police, who soon entered the fray by naming the KPK chairman, Abraham Samad, as a suspect in a document forgery case (Jakarta Globe, 17 Feb. 2015). Another commissioner, Bambang Widjojanto, was arrested for allegedly instructing witnesses to provide false testimony in a trial held at the Constitutional Court several years earlier. Since its establishment, in 2002, the KPK has made substantial progress combating corruption, long considered by Indonesians and foreign observers to be the nation’s most serious problem. The KPK is widely seen as a great anti-corruption success story, having imprisoned hundreds of tainted business people, senior police officers, politicians, and government officials.9 Jokowi’s reluctance to stop the criminalisation of the KPK was deeply disappointing to his volunteer support base. The controversy also damaged Jokowi by drawing an implicit comparison with his predecessor; many had blamed Yudhoyono for being indecisive, but at least he had been effective in defending the KPK during previous crises.10

Jokowi was politically paralysed by the entrenched oligarchs within his own party coalition, but he was not completely tamed. Jokowi’s ambivalent relationship with Megawati has, by extension, engaged PDI-P, the largest shareholder in Jokowi’s government, in a complicated relationship with the Presidential Palace (Jakarta Post, 10 April 2015). Aside from cancelling the appointment of Megawati’s confidante Budi Gunawan, both as a minister and as police chief, Jokowi refused to dismiss Luhut Panjaitan as his chief of staff or Rini Soemarno as the minister of state enterprises, despite pressure from Megawati.11 Notwithstanding such sources of

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9. For a detailed discussion of the KPK’s success in combating corruption, see Bolongaita’s (2010) report.
10. See, for example, the work of Fealy (2015).
11. In the cabinet shake-up in August 2015, Jokowi even appointed Luhut coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs.
friction, Megawati cannot deny that Jokowi alone was able to end PDI–P’s long wait to become the ruling party. In another show of his independence, Jokowi removed Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, Surya Paloh’s protégé, from the cabinet in the 2015 reshuffle, despite Paloh’s huge financial and political support in bringing Jokowi to office.

The events of Jokowi’s first year in power suggest that oligarchs are neither politically homogeneous nor economically monolithic. In mid-August 2015, for instance, Rizal Ramli, the newly appointed coordinating minister for maritime affairs, publicly criticised the government’s plan to build power plants to add 35,000 megawatts of electricity to the national grid, claiming the undertaking was Kalla’s idea. Rizal is closely associated with Luhut Panjaitan and has a good relationship with Megawati. Overall, however, the explanatory power of the oligarchy paradigm is irresistible, and the level of oligarchic capture in Indonesia is extremely robust. Most Indonesian political parties have been ‘hijacked’ by powerful oligarchs, including Golkar’s Aburizal Bakrie, Gerindra’s Prabowo, and NasDem’s Paloh. It is evident that political parties have become the main tool of oligarchic domination, opening the door for oligarchs to influence all decisions, including those taken by their representatives in parliament and in government institutions. In order to govern effectively, with so little political capital in hand, Jokowi needs to maintain good rapport with the ruling parties and the oligarchs who lead them. This burden does not fully explain the lack of reform impetus, however.

**JOKOWI AS POLITICAL LEADER**

In addition to pressures from oligarchic forces, personal factors help explain why Jokowi has sacrificed reform for realpolitik. During his first year as president, he showed that he places greater value on economic development than on democratic reform. Indeed, his understanding of democracy itself is framed in concrete, instrumental terms, at the expense of abstract or philosophical conceptualisation. As he said during one of the televised presidential debates in 2014, when asked to explain what democracy meant to him, ‘Democracy is about listening to the people and taking concrete action. That is why we have spent a lot of time visiting villages, markets, and fishing communities’. For Jokowi, for democracy to be meaningful, people should enjoy tangible benefits through true economic and social development.

Mietzner’s (2015) notion of technocratic populism is useful in looking at Jokowi’s emerging political persona and his tendency to prioritise economic development over democratic reform. Mietzner argues that Jokowi’s political outlook mixes non-ideological technocratic pragmatism and social empathy with the poor. Jokowi’s grand ambitions relate to economic development and social welfare, while his major achievements in government include simplifying regulations that burden investors, continuing to push for infrastructure development, by, for example, facilitating the disbursement of village funds, particularly for irrigation, bridges, and roads (*Jakarta Post*, 9 Sept. 2015); and implementing social-welfare programs, such as health cards and smart cards. To fund these policies at the national level, Jokowi removed fuel subsidies in November 2014.

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12. Much of the work of Winters, Hadiz, and Robison tends to give the impression that oligarchy is politically homogeneous.
Jokowi seems to think of non-economic sectors as secondary, or as mere instruments for improving the economy and people’s welfare. His concern for democratic reform should thus be looked at from an economic perspective. When his economic goals are at odds with his anti-corruption agenda, for example, he seems to prioritise the former. In August, for instance, amid the general decrease in government spending and in an effort to increase it after the economic slowdown, Jokowi instructed that a circular be prepared for regional leaders on how to avoid becoming corruption suspects (Jakarta Post, 26 Aug. 2015). In so doing, Jokowi showed he understood that anti-corruption measures were discouraging local leaders from initiating new projects. The dismissal of Budi Waseso in early September 2015 as the chief of the police’s criminal investigation unit (Kabareskrim) is another example of Jokowi’s belief in eradicating corruption without creating controversy that could hinder the economy. Jokowi forced Budi to step down because of a police investigation into a major corruption case involving state-owned port operator PT Pelindo II (Jakarta Post, 3 Sept. 2015). Budi had already become notorious for his role in criminalising the KPK during the first part of 2015, but Jokowi did not take action against Waseso at the time, nor did he take other steps to defend the KPK. It was not until Budi threatened one of Indonesia’s major state-owned enterprises—and one critical to Jokowi’s vision of enhanced infrastructure development—that the president acted.

Jokowi has paid a heavy price for rewarding party oligarchs and for prioritising the economy over democratic reform. He failed in his first year to affirm his image as a real reformer and to bring a new style of politics to the presidency, and his economic agenda has yet to benefit the public.\(^{13}\) As a result, the level of public approval for Jokowi has declined significantly.

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13. In September, Yusuf and Sumner (2015) suggested it was too early to conclude whether Jokowi’s economic reform has benefited the public.
public satisfaction in his leadership fell rapidly during his first months in office. A nationwide survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) between 25 May and 2 June 2015 revealed that Jokowi’s approval rating was at its lowest ebb since he took office. Only 41% of the public approved of Jokowi, down from 62% a couple of months earlier (before the Budi Gunawan affair took place) (figure 1). According to SMRC, the public believed that Jokowi had underperformed in three important areas: the economy, politics, and law enforcement, with the economy the public’s biggest concern (Jakarta Post, 10 July 2015). The survey also revealed that 32% of respondents believed that the economy had deteriorated since Jokowi took over the presidency, while 38% felt that way about the political situation. Likewise, 38% of respondents believed that the level of law enforcement had declined during the survey period (Jakarta Post, 10 July 2015).

The survey found that Jokowi’s approval rating trailed those of former president Yudhoyono in the first year of each of his two terms, which stood at 70% (2005) and 66% (2010). What is startling is that Jokowi’s public dissatisfaction rating exceeded his satisfaction rating (figure 2). His efforts to regain the people’s faith, such as by showing decisiveness in pursuing capital punishment for drug smugglers in April 2015, failed to stop the decline of his approval rating. Losing popularity and support from his volunteer base matter to him politically. Jokowi was presented by mass-media as both a newcomer and an outsider untouched by corruption scandals, providing a rationale for his earlier high levels of popularity (Hadiz 2014). He won the last election because the people trusted him and wanted him to be president. Since he is politically weak, however, and governs from a triple-minority position, his only real bargaining chip is his popularity. When Jokowi’s public approval rating began to decline, it left him with less bargaining power.

![FIGURE 2 Jokowi’s Approval Rating Compared with Yudhoyono’s (%)](image)

Source: Data from SMRC (2015)

Note: DK/NA = do not know or not available. The sample size is 1,220 respondents, selected at random from all 34 provinces. Based on the sample size, the estimated margin of error is ± 2.9% at the 95% confidence level.
Post-Soeharto presidents commonly enjoy a honeymoon period with the public for their first year in office. This was not the case for Jokowi. By mid-2015, his honeymoon was over and it was his own alliances that had cut it short. It was clear that Jokowi needed to rethink his approach to government and lay the foundations for the effective administration necessary to regain public faith.

**ADJUSTING THE RULING FORMULA**

Partly in response to his declining public approval, and partly in response to the problems that had beset his relations with parliament and his own coalition, Jokowi began to take steps to adjust his ruling formula. Some of these steps look promising. When Jokowi found himself fighting his own coalition more than the so-called opposition, he moved to seek support from parties on a case-by-case basis. One sign of this adjustment was the way in which Jokowi finally dealt with the problems between Budi Gunawan and the KPK, after constraints from his own alliances had pushed him into creating more wriggle room for manoeuvring in his favour.¹⁴ Jokowi benefited from the pragmatism of political elites and their tendency to be non-ideological, which enables them to move in any direction. In the Budi Gunawan case, Jokowi even reached out to other oligarchs—namely, Prabowo and Bakrie—who formed a formidable force in parliament to counterbalance the increasing influence of Megawati, and asked them for support in cancelling Budi Gunawan’s candidacy. Jokowi submitted an alternative candidate for approval by the opposition-dominated parliament, a compromise was eventually reached, and Badrodin Haiti was ultimately appointed police chief, while the allegedly corrupt Budi was chosen as second in command. It was the only realistic option for Jokowi, both to regain public faith—especially among his impatient middle-class supporters—over the police-versus-KPK saga and to appease his patron Megawati.

There were also compromises in opposition. By the end of January 2015, Prabowo had adopted a less confrontational approach towards the Jokowi administration. Since then, he has agreed to meet Jokowi a few times and has pledged to maintain stability in government. There are several possible reasons behind Prabowo’s move. First, he may have realised that the public is generally not in favour of a radical opposition, and that maintaining such an opposition might alienate his support base, as indicated by at least one national survey (by SMRC, in October 2014). Prabowo has enjoyed increased public support since his reconciliatory gesture of attending Jokowi’s inauguration, his acceptance of Jokowi’s invitation to visit him in late January 2015 at Bogor Palace, and his pledge not to exploit the Budi Gunawan affair in order to impeach the president.

Second, Prabowo began to soften his opposition once he learned that he could control only his own party and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). After his early display of force, Prabowo understood he had to be realistic: his coalition was on the verge of breaking apart. The strength and solidarity of KMP have weakened since Golkar and PPP began to suffer from internal tensions that threatened to change

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¹⁴ To be fair, KIH does not always constrain Jokowi. When he decided to raise the fuel subsidy in November 2014, for instance, his allies sided with him, defending this unpopular policy among politicians and explaining the urgency of fuel-subsidy cuts.
their allegiances. The government, meanwhile, began to benefit from pro-Jokowi factions in Golkar and PPP, thereby broadening Jokowi’s support base in the DPR. PAN (National Mandate Party), for example, has moved closer to Jokowi since its new chair, Zulkiifi Hasan, took office in May.

Third, Prabowo might have been caught by his promise to be a democrat and always uphold the constitutional power through democratic means (New Mandala, 1 July 2014). Furthermore, almost 68% of voters surveyed believed that Jokowi should not be removed from office before 2019, despite a large proportion of the electorate being disillusioned with his performance (SMRC 2015). Only 13% of voters surveyed believed that Jokowi should be ousted outside of an election, suggesting that Indonesian voters, while critical, still largely believe in orderly and democratic change. If Prabowo wants to maintain his chance of running in the next election, he needs to be patient.

There was also speculation about a short-term deal between Jokowi and Prabowo, which seemed to be confirmed by a closed-door meeting between the two on 29 January 2015, ahead of the DPR’s plenary session to pass the 2015 state budget. Rumours circulated that oligarchic-style concessions had been offered, allegedly linked to Prabowo’s Kiani Kertas, a paper-pulp and plantation company that has been experiencing financial difficulties. The evidence is much clearer in the case of providing concessions for Golkar head Aburizal, who has emerged as the second-most-powerful opposition leader after Prabowo. Law 3/2015 on the State Budget Amendment requires the government to allocate a Rp 781.6 billion loan to compensate victims of the Sidoarjo mudflow disaster, in East Java, for which Aburizal’s company Lapindo was deemed to be at fault (Jakarta Post, 14 Feb. 2015).

With the passage of time, it appears that Jokowi is getting more comfortable in dealing with elites and in handling the power of the presidency. He has used a classic carrot-and-stick strategy to cope with the opposition-dominated parliament. Jokowi seemed to use harsh measures, for example, in responding to the leadership disputes that erupted within Golkar and PPP in late 2014, with the minister of justice and human rights issuing a decree recognising pro-Jokowi factions in both parties. He also used the stick by appointing a NasDem politician, H. M. Prasetyo, as attorney-general. After Prasetyo’s appointment, the attorney-general’s office arrested several politicians from opposition parties, including the head of Golkar’s West Java chapter, Irianto M. S. Syafiuddin, for his alleged role in graft (Jakarta Post, 3 Feb. 2015). It is clear that Jokowi is willing to use state instruments to warn the opposition against destabilising his administration. He has also offered carrots, granting a number of concessions to KMP (aside from the government’s loan to compensate victims of the Sidoarjo mudflow disaster).

In January 2015, the minister of home affairs, Tjahjo Kumolo, officially submitted a request for a significant increase in annual funding for political parties, which understandably gained a lot of support from the opposition (Jakarta Post, 26 June 2015). Jokowi also allocated funds in the 2015 state budget for so-called aspiration houses for individual legislators in their home constituencies, which was of course applauded by the opposition. The allocated budget for the program includes providing one personal assistant and two expert staff members for individual members of parliament (Jakarta Post, 9 June 2015).

Jokowi’s strengthening power base has been also marked by his attempts since late April 2015 to solidify the support of his main patron, Megawati. After a
rocky start, Jokowi apparently achieved a smoother relationship with Megawati by using cultural approaches such as showing his respect by kissing her hand in public, inviting her to attend state ceremonies, and appointing some of her confidantes in governmental posts. He appears to have adopted a Javanese proverb to express his acceptance of (ngalali) and respect for Megawati: wong Jowo nek dipangku mati.\textsuperscript{15} It means that Jokowi strategically lowers himself, puts up no resistance, and metaphorically takes Megawati onto his lap. By so doing he renders her incapable of opposition. The relationship between Megawati and Jokowi cannot be fully explained from an oligarchy perspective, and Megawati is not really an oligarch in the traditional sense.

In early September 2015, Jokowi again strengthened his power base when PAN shifted its support to the government. With the presence of the fifth-biggest party, the ruling coalition inched closer to controlling a majority in parliament (from 37% to 46% of parliamentary seats). With two opposition parties (Golkar and PPP) divided over leadership disputes, the inclusion of PAN in the government coalition has dramatically changed the political dynamics in parliament. If pro-Jokowi factions in both Golkar and PPP sided with the government, Jokowi would be able to outnumber the seats controlled by the opposition—even without the help of the neutral Democratic Party. Jokowi has to pay a price for this support, however. In the event of a cabinet reshuffle, he will hand PAN at least two ministerial posts in exchange for joining his coalition, giving PAN greater access to the patronage resources of the state executive than what it had under its run-of-the-mill parliamentary commission-chair positions in Prabowo’s coalition. It is also now common knowledge that another form of compensation provided for all members in the government club is that they can receive legal protection from corruption investigations (\textit{Jakarta Post}, 3 Sept. 2015).

In summary, since late 2014 Jokowi has become more confident in exercising his power by using both threats and inducements, a sign that Indonesia is drifting back towards a broad-based cartel. If the Supreme Court approves the legality of pro-Jokowi factions in Golkar and PPP and provides final and binding court rulings on these parties’ legitimate leaders, Jokowi’s government might mark the resurgence of the ruling cartel.

CONCLUSION
I have endeavoured to explain the personal and external factors behind Jokowi’s failure to push through far-reaching reform during his first year in office. He came to power burdened with high expectations, and was widely believed to be a real reformer, untainted by corruption, and different from the typical politician. After a year in office, however, Jokowi looked surprisingly conservative, disappointing the early expectations of those who had hoped he would revive political reform in Indonesia. This is partly a result of Jokowi’s preference for economic measures over democratic reform. He was particularly concerned that stern anti-corruption measures could cause an economic downturn. For Jokowi, democratic reform should be a mechanism for increasing good governance and bureaucratic reform (by increasing efficiency and transparency, for example, and by reducing red tape

\textsuperscript{15} For a more detailed discussion of the proverb, see the book by Romano (2013, 165).
and corruption) that facilitates economic development. Jokowi seemingly has no problem with anti-corruption campaigns as long as they have no impact on the economy.

Structural factors were also important in explaining Jokowi’s lack of reform. The institutional settings of Indonesia’s multiparty presidential system, along with the existence of powerful interests that shape the country’s politics and economy, would make it difficult for any president to form a non-collusive administration and push through extensive reform. After years of Indonesia’s being controlled by a far-reaching party cartel, Jokowi is the first president to have established a minority government in the country, perhaps signalling the death of the ruling cartel. This, however, made him politically vulnerable, because he had to pay for winning government by losing the majority in parliament. Jokowi conceded power to end the party cartels, and he was eventually trapped in the usual practices of trading cabinet posts for support and of granting greater access to patronage opportunities to reward party oligarchs. Despite the power of the oligarchy thesis in explaining the Jokowi government, some of the events in the first year of his presidency were hardly consistent with oligarchy paradigm. Jokowi was not completely under the thumb of oligarchs, for example, and there was strong evidence that Indonesia’s oligarchs are not politically homogeneous and can each promote policies that are at odds with the interests of their peers.

Where does this account of Jokowi’s term in government so far—notably his choice of cabinet members, the Budi Gunawan case, and the weakening of the KPK—side in relation to the two competing schools of thought for explaining post-Soeharto politics? Overall, it would seem that the first year of Jokowi’s presidency provides more proof in support of the oligarchy theorists than it does in support of the cartelisation scholars. Jokowi set about establishing a government that departed from the cartel pattern. Rather than form an oversized coalition, as his predecessors had done, he formed a coalition that was notably undersized. Jokowi’s first year produced evidence that the oligarchy theorists’ interpretation seems to best explain the dynamics of politics under the Jokowi presidency. It is virtually impossible for any president to overturn the oligarchic influences in Indonesian politics. Nonetheless, Jokowi’s recent adjustments to his ruling formula indicated that he is trying to build broader support in order to be a politically effective leader, while garnering political support from the old guard. The cartel may not be dead yet.

REFERENCES


