Disaster Relief in the Asia Pacific
Agency and resilience

Edited by
Minako Sakai, Edwin Jurriëns, Jian Zhang and Alec Thornton
Disaster Relief in the Asia Pacific

A UN report recently found that the Asia Pacific is the world's most disaster-prone region. Indeed, considering that the region accounts for more than half of the total number of disasters in the world, building capacity and resilience to mitigate the devastating impact of disasters is a pressing task for local actors.

This book takes a regional, multidisciplinary and multi-actor approach to improve understandings of how various actors respond to natural and human-induced disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. It examines the ideas and activities of four different categories of agents: civil society; military and state institutions; local cultural knowledge and the media; and economic initiatives, and these themes are approached from various academic disciplines, ranging from anthropology and cultural studies to economics, human geography and political science. The contributors draw their findings from a variety of countries in the region, including China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar and Samoa, and importantly, focus on the interconnection between vulnerability and resilience. In turn, the book highlights how the nature and magnitude of disasters are influenced by social conditions, and aims to contribute to policies that prioritize development opportunities to enhance resilience. Further, it explores the complicated and multifaceted role of agency in building resilience, and presents a comparative framework for analysis and key findings from the Asia-Pacific region.

The focus of this book on recent and ongoing disasters makes it a topical and timely contribution to the growing field of disaster management, and as such it will appeal to students and scholars of environmental studies, development studies and Asian politics.

Minako Sakai is Senior Lecturer in Southeast Asian Social Inquiry, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia.

Edwin Jurriëns is Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne and Visiting Fellow at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia.

Jian Zhang is Senior Lecturer in Political Science in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia.

Alec Thornton is Senior Lecturer in Geography, School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia.
# Routledge contemporary Asia series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Taiwan and Post-Communist Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Asian–European Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Environmental Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Politics of Civic Space in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Trade and Contemporary Society Along the Silk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Education as a Political Tool in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Human Genetic Biobanks in Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shopping for allies</td>
<td>Czesław Tubilewicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The theory and practice of interregionalism</td>
<td>Alfredo C. Robles, Jr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edited by Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building blocks for global governance?</td>
<td>Edited by Jürgen Rüland, Gunter Schubert, Günter Schucher and Cornelia Storz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward a green silicon island</td>
<td>Jack F. Williams and Ch’ang-yi David Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A tail wagging two dogs</td>
<td>Su Chi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building urban communities</td>
<td>Edited by Amrita Daniere and Mike Douglass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An ethno-history of Ladakh</td>
<td>Jacqueline Fewkes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edited by Richard Carney</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jae-Cheon Lim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edited by Marie Lall and Edward Vickers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics of trust and scientific advancement</td>
<td>Edited by Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13 East Asian Regionalism from a Legal Perspective
   Current features and a vision for the future
   Edited by Tamio Nakamura

14 Dissent and Cultural Resistance in Asia’s Cities
   Edited by Melissa Butcher and Selvaraj Velayutham

15 Preventing Corruption in Asia
   Institutional design and policy capacity
   Edited by Ting Gong and Stephen Ma

16 Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia
   Strategic and policy challenges
   Edited by Julien Chaisse and Philippe Gugler

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   Knowledge and technology networks from Japan
   Dennis McNamara

18 Regional Minorities and Development in Asia
   Edited by Huhua Cao and Elizabeth Morrell

19 Regionalism in China–Vietnam Relations
   Institution-building in the Greater Mekong subregion
   Oliver Hensengerth

20 From Orientalism to Postcolonialism
   Asia-Europe and the lineages of difference
   Edited by Sucheta Mazumdar, Kaiwar Vasant and Thierry Labica

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   Containing contention
   Stephan Ortmann

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   Considering the other through ethnonyms, territories and rituals
   Edited by Christian Culas and François Robinne

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   Political, economic and multilateral relations
   Edited by Jörn Dosch and Olaf Jacob

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   Globalization and foreign aid in the 21st century
   Edited by Howard P. Lehman

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   Altering questions and changing frameworks
   Edited by Georgette Wang

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   Edited by Tai-Chee Wong and Jonathan Rigg

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   Sheng-mei Ma

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   Reflections on identity and regionalism
   Edited by Leong Yew

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   State, sub-state and non-state relations
   Utpal Vyas
30 Enhancing Asia-Europe Co-operation through Educational Exchange
Georg Wiessala

31 History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia
Divided memories
Edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider

32 The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia
Edited by Ishtiaq Ahmed

33 The Chinese/Vietnamese Diaspora
Revisiting the boatpeople
Edited by Yuk Wah Chan

34 The Dynamics of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Asia
Vibrant societies
Edited by Amrita Daniere and Hy Van Luong

35 Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics
Rivalry or partnership for China, Russia and Central Asia?
Edited by Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanström

36 Asian Popular Culture in Transition
Edited by John A. Lent and Lorna Fitzsimmons

37 Sexual Diversity in Asia, c.600–1950
Edited by Raquel Reyes and William G. Clarence Smith

38 Asia's Role in Governing Global Health
Edited by Kelley Lee, Tikki Pang and Yeling Tan

39 Asian Heritage Management
Contexts, concerns, and prospects
Edited by Kapila D. Silva and Neel Kamal Chapagain

40 Genocide and Mass Atrocities in Asia
Legacies and prevention
Edited by Deborah Mayerson and Annie Pohlman

41 Child Security in Asia
The impact of armed conflict in Cambodia and Myanmar
Cecilia Jacob

42 Vietnamese-Chinese Relationships at the Borderlands
Trade, tourism and cultural politics
Yuk Wah Chan

43 Asianism and the Politics of Regional Consciousness in Singapore
Leong Yew

44 Disaster Relief in the Asia Pacific
Agency and resilience
Edited by Minako Sakai, Edwin Jurriëns, Jian Zhang and Alec Thornton

45 Human Trafficking in Asia
Forcing issues
Edited by Sallie Yea
# Contents

List of illustrations  
Notes on contributors  
Acknowledgments  
List of abbreviations  
Map of the sites of disasters in the book

## Introduction

1 Coping with disaster: agency and resilience in the Asia-Pacific context  
 EDWIN JURRIËNS, MINAKO SAKAI, ALEC THORNTON AND JIAN ZHANG  

## PART I  
Civil society

2 Responding to disasters in the Asia-Pacific region: state and civil society relationships  
 DAVID W. LOVELL  

3 Key factors for capacity-building of disaster relief operations: Indonesian examples  
 MINAKO SAKAI AND AMELIA FAUZIA  

4 Fostering civil society organizations for disaster relief in Japan: challenges and prospects for sustainable future operations  
 MINAKO SAKAI AND KEISHIN INABA
PART II
Military and state institutions

5 The military and disaster relief in China: trends, drivers and implications
JIAN ZHANG

6 Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis and regional intermediaries
CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS

7 Temporalities of planning and disaster: slum demolition and the rebuilding of lives at the margins of Delhi
URSULA RAO

PART III
Local cultural knowledge and the media

8 The politics of the Mount Merapi eruption in Central Java, Indonesia
PRIYAMBUDI SULISTIYANTO

9 Coping with floods in urban Fiji: responses and resilience of the poor
JENNY BRYANT-TOKALAU AND JOHN CAMPBELL

10 From early warning system to trauma healing: alternative media and disaster relief in Central Java
EDWIN JURRIËNS

PART IV
Economic initiatives

11 Agrarianism, capitalism or protectionism? Exploring economic restructuring and local responses amidst global change in Samoa
ALEC THORNTON AND ETIENNE NEL

12 Responding to natural versus human-made disasters: lessons from Fiji
SATISH CHAND
Conclusion

13 Lessons from disaster relief in the Asia Pacific

JIAN ZHANG, MINAKO SAKAI AND EDWIN JURRIËNS
Illustrations

Plates
4.1 Showing Makenaizou towels 61
6.1 Welcome messages at the Mandalay Palace 88

Figures
12.1 Building permits issued for new private dwellings, 1983–2010 194
12.2 Per capita GDP in US dollars at 2000 prices for Fiji, Mauritius and Malta 195

Tables
8.1 Refugees from the Mount Merapi eruption (5 November 2010) 123
11.1 Key informants and coding 173
12.1 Description and summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 193
12.2 Regression results of the impact of coups versus natural disasters 198
Contributors

Jenny Bryant-Tokalau is Associate Professor in Geography, in the School of Maori, Pacific and Indigenous Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. Her research areas include the Qolitqoli (foreshore) and informal settlement in Fiji; poverty and environmental governance in the Pacific; and the impacts of natural disasters on Pacific urban-dwellers.

John Campbell is Associate Professor in the Geography, Tourism and Environmental Planning Programme, University of Waikato, New Zealand. His research areas include the human dimensions of natural hazards, global warming in the Pacific, and global environmental change.

Satish Chand is Professor of Finance in the School of Business at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, at the Australian Defence Force Academy. His research interests include labour migration, and the challenges of development in communities torn by conflict.

Amelia Fauzia is Lecturer and Deputy Director of the Research Institute of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, and is Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. She is the author of Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia (E.J. Brill, Leiden).

Keishin Inaba is Associate Professor of Sociology in the Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, Japan. His current research focuses on altruism, civil society and religion as social capital in contemporary Japan.

Edwin Jurriëns is Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, and Visiting Fellow at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. His research interests include media and contemporary art, with a specific focus on Indonesia.

David W. Lovell is Professor of Politics and Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has published in the areas of Australian politics, communist and post-communist political systems, the history of political thought, and the problems of democratization.
Contributors

Etienne Nel is Professor of Geography, University of Otago, New Zealand. His primary research interests lie in the broad areas of economic geography and local economic development. He is on the editorial board of the journals *Applied Geography*, *Local Economy* and the *Journal of Geography in Higher Education*.

Ursula Rao is Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Institute of Anthropology at the University of Leipzig in Germany. Her current research focuses on e-governance and cultural transformations in India. She has also written on Hindi and English journalism, urban space and ritual theory.

Christopher Roberts is Senior Lecturer at the National Security College within the Australian National University. He specializes in the politics and security of East Asia. He has published on a broad range of subject areas including ASEAN and East Asian regionalism; the implications of state weakness, culture and identity for collaboration; and the foreign affairs of Myanmar, Laos, Brunei and Australia.

Minako Sakai is Senior Lecturer and Program Coordinator of Southeast Asian Social Inquiry, School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. Her current research topics focus on the role of regionalism and religious (Islamic) organizations in social policy in Indonesia.

Priyambudi Sulistiyanto is Senior Lecturer and Head of Flinders Asia Centre, School of International Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide. He has published on the topics of local politics in Southeast Asia and the politics of reconciliation.

Alec Thornton is Senior Lecturer in Geography at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. His primary research interests lie in urban agriculture, land use and the social production of space. He is on the editorial board of the journals *Applied Geography* and *Urban Forum*.

Jian Zhang is Senior Lecturer in Political Science in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. His primary research interests are China’s foreign and defence policies, the Chinese military and traditional and non-traditional issues in the Asia Pacific.
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Note

1 The Asia-Pacific Seminar Series details may be browsed online at http://hass.unsw.adfa.edu.au/apss.
3 Key factors for capacity-building of disaster relief operations

Indonesian examples

Minako Sakai and Amelia Fauzia

Introduction

This chapter will focus on state and civil society relations for effective disaster management and post-disaster community recovery. There is a growing interest in the role of civil society in disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery among scholars (Aldrich 2008, 2012; Benthall 2008; Hackworth and Akers 2010; Clarke 2010; Chamlee-Wright 2010; Kage 2011; MacRae and Hodgkin 2011). Reflecting these scholarly findings, policymakers have started to focus on the role of civil society in various aspects and phases of disaster management. For example, in 2010 the Australian Government launched a new program, the Australia–Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction, to reduce disaster risk, and committed A$67 million (2008–13) through the Australian aid program (AIFDR n.d.). One of the key identified areas in this program is building stronger partnerships at the level of civil society organizations. We define civil society organizations as groups that are relatively independent of the state and operating within a framework of civility, tolerance and self-regulation (see Lovell, in this volume).

As demonstrated by these scholarly findings and policy implementations above, the role of civil society organizations is among the most important factors mitigating the risk and reducing the impact of natural disasters. This is because natural disasters such as flooding, mud slides and earthquakes may be induced by nature, but the impact of nature-induced disasters could significantly vary depending on the social conditions, as these natural disasters can affect various types of vulnerability (Ozerdem and Jacoby 2006: 11). How effectively civil society organizations can function in partnership with the government is an important question for disaster management and risk mitigation. Social capital including trust, norms and networks within society affects community solidarity, which helps the post-disaster recovery process (Aldrich 2012; Buckland and Rahman 1999; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Murphy 2007; Patterson et al. 2010; Kusakabe 2012). Therefore, it is important for policymakers to create new ways to strengthen and forge new ties and networks to build disaster resilience (see Introduction, this volume). As an example, we will focus on civil society organizations (CSOs) in Indonesia, and will explore relationships between different civil society organizations and their relationship with the state.
The focus of this chapter is Indonesia, a country with a population of 240 million in the Asia-Pacific region, where natural disasters are frequent and negatively impact on social and economic development. In order to mitigate disaster-related risk, in 2007, the Indonesian Government legislated the Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management, and, based on this law, it established the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in 2008, and the national disaster management plan for 2010–14. The 2007 law is in line with the UN-agreed international strategy for disaster reduction known as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). The law aims to mitigate disaster risk responding to climate change, and to support sustainable development in Indonesia.

Although the role of CSOs is recognized by scholars and policymakers as a crucial form of disaster management, it is important to note that civil society in Indonesia is neither traditionally strong nor extensive. Following the collapse of the Suharto Government in 1998, Indonesians gained the freedom to organize mass activities without political surveillance. Since this period, however, relationships between the Indonesian Government and CSOs have been lukewarm and CSOs are generally not engaged in dialogue or partnerships beyond their own networks. Further complicating this situation, after the Aceh Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, international CSOs have established their offices and operations in Indonesia, but they have not forged strong partnerships with the existing local CSOs (cf. MacRae and Hodgkin 2011). Some of the existing studies (Izumi and Shaw 2011) on the role of CSOs in disaster-relief operations in Indonesia do not, however, sufficiently reflect these complex local conditions surrounding CSO operations. In order to identify key factors to strengthen state and civil society partnerships, this chapter will address the following questions.

- Which civil society organizations are undertaking disaster relief in Indonesia?
- Are there any emerging partnerships across CSOs and government agencies?
- What are the barriers for building effective partnerships?

The structure of this chapter will, first, seek to identify several reasons why faith-based organizations in Indonesia are the main CSO disaster-relief operators. It will also identify several issues that are impeding partnerships from forming between Indonesian government agencies, CSOs and the international community. Second, we will draw our analysis from recent disaster case studies in Indonesia. In doing so, we will identify challenges and problems that existed prior to the national law, the Law No. 24/2007 and its coordinating agency, BNPB. Third, we will then examine whether the identified problems and weaknesses have been addressed, particularly after the legislation of the Law No. 24/2007. Finally, we will review the role and the effectiveness of the BNPB in coordinating disaster-relief operations. We note that there are four critical phases of disaster management: mitigation, preparedness, immediate disaster-relief response, and post-recovery period. Due to the limitation of credible data for all
the four phases, however, our analysis will focus on the immediate disaster-relief response period.

**Constraints on CSO development in Indonesia**

The development of humanitarian assistance organizations in contemporary Indonesia is relatively recent, and has been affected by the existing nature of CSOs in the country. The nature of the development of CSOs in Indonesia may be described as fragmented and weak due to several factors.

First, Indonesia is a newly democratized country, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, and has not had much time to develop strong civil society organisations. Prior to the fall of the centralistic Suharto Government, through the Law No. 5/1985 on social organizations, all mass organizations had to be based on the state ideology, *Pancasila*, and the government had the power to disband organizations deemed to be subversive. This discouraged civil society organizations from developing transparent structures from fear that the government may fault certain personnel, as well as organizational aims and ideology that could be regarded as anti-government and politically destabilizing. Moreover, organizations that decided to hide their true ideologies (that is, Islamic or communist) could be disbanded (Eldridge 1995: 48–9). Since the fall of Suharto, civil society organizations have mushroomed in Indonesia, but a lack of organizational accountability has been among the main constraints that have negatively affected the development of civil society organizations (Antløv et al. 2010). Second, in the 1980s, CSOs started to develop in Indonesia along with emergent student and labour movements. CSOs often had a confrontational relationship with the government in the areas of the environment, human rights and labour movements (Aspinall 2005: 49–115). This has led to state distrust of CSOs (Antløv et al. 2010).

Third, secular, elitist, urban non-governmental organizations (NGOs) did not develop strong relations with grassroots community members. Instead, religious organizations have developed their own extensive networks to run community development programs along with their strong focus on education. This is because during the ‘New Order’ period, people could freely meet at social-religious gatherings, which were deemed the least political. Consequently, religious study groups became unique venues at which to discuss social problems. This context has assisted religious groups to carry out activities to address social injustice in Indonesia.

The development of faith-based organizations as social service providers varied across religions and even among denominations of religious groups. For example, during the New Order period, Catholics and other Christians were relatively successful in separating the church as the spiritual body from its secondary role in providing community development programs (Eldridge 1995: 170–7). In this sense, they have developed more systematic institutions to address social needs. Using domestic religious alms from relatively wealthy ethnic Chinese-Indonesians and their external links, they have run community
development programs through their own networks. Compared with this, during the New Order period Indonesian Muslims experienced more difficulty in separating religion and state due to their theological interpretations. For example, responding to the ‘Law on social organizations’ in 1985, the largest traditionalist Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), withdrew from political activities but remained active in social activities. A large, modernist Muslim organization, Muhamadiyah, continues to offer social programs such as educational institutions, hospitals and orphanages, which are supported by its members (Latief 2010). The push to include the emergent middle-class Muslim Indonesians, who do not belong to these two Muslim organizations, to support social programs for the disadvantaged started in the 1990s, when Islamic obligatory alms payments (zakat) were highlighted as sustainable sources for funding social programs. This idea was strongly advocated by a private zakat-fund management agency, the Dompet Dhuafa Foundation, established in 1993 by journalists of the Islamic daily newspaper Republika. The increased interest in zakat has created national networks of zakat organizations, which led to the legislation of the zakat management law in 1999. Collected alms have been one of the few internal funding sources for CSOs in Indonesia and these funds have been used to run social programs in order to assist the disadvantaged, and increasingly, to assist the victims of natural disasters, as the latter continues to affect Indonesia. In the zakat movement, newly emerged Islamic organizations have succeeded in receiving donations from the community; and these donations have outnumbered those collected by public zakat-collection agencies (see Indonesia Magnificence of Zakat and Pusat Ekonomi dan Bisnis Syariah 2010: 31).

Disaster relief CSOs and their constraints

The emergence of CSOs that specialize in disaster relief is relatively recent in Indonesia. There are three categories of disaster-relief CSOs: (1) secular society groups; (2) religious CSOs; and (3) international faith-based CSOs. The first two categories are mainly local groups that had existed before the Aceh tsunami in 2004. Religious CSOs include a variety of faith-based organizations. Profiles of some prominent faith-based organizations involved in disaster relief operations in Indonesia are summarized below.

Indonesian Christian Church

The synod of the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) and the synod of the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) founded the Christian Foundation for Public Health (YAKKUM) in 1950. Under YAKKUM, there is another social wing known as CD Bethesda, established in 1974, committed to providing public health and community development programs. In order to maximize its efficiency and respond to the increasing demands of disaster relief, YAKKUM established an emergency relief unit, the YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU). In addition, the GKI operates an emergency rescue and search mission unit, the Indonesian
Humanitarian Movement (Gerakan Kemanusiaan Indonesia or GKI). The coordination and communication among various affiliated social wings remain relatively loose as the pressing demands to address disaster relief take precedence. As this is a Christian-based relief organization, public acceptance, particularly in predominantly Muslim regions, remains problematic. This is one reason the church abbreviation, GKI, is rephrased as an abbreviation of the Indonesian Humanitarian Movement, which does not contain any religious meaning.

The Dompet Dhufa Foundation

This foundation is an exemplary case of emergent zakat-funded social organizations. In January 1993, an Islamic daily, the Republika, was established. It regularly advertised social charity donation accounts following a natural disaster (for example, landslides and earthquakes), and later created the Dompet Dhufa (DD). When an earthquake took place in Liwa, Lampung, in 1994, DD became directly involved in disaster-relief operations together with the Indonesian local and national government agencies. In post-disaster recovery, DD contributed funds to rebuild a local school, and the foundation also established an Islamic credit and savings cooperative, which supported the development of economic activities in affected communities. As the DD expanded, in 2002, its leaders introduced a new management system, from which specialized programs could be developed into an independent institution loosely connected to the DD. This increased the professionalism of the DD workers and the social status of the program leaders. Consequently, the DD’s emergency relief unit (Aksi Cepat Tanggap or ACT) became an independent institution. Due to internal disagreements, the ACT left the DD network in 2009, which led to the subsequent creation of a new unit, the DD Disaster Management Centre.

The Catholic Church

The Catholic Church has operated its community development programs and disaster-relief assistance through its channel, Catholic Relief Services, without formalizing its institutional status within Indonesia. Its disaster-relief operation in Indonesia was officially institutionalized in 2006 under the name of Caritas Indonesia (Karina), responding to increased need for humanitarian relief after the Aceh tsunami in 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006.

Muhammadiah

Muhammadiah conducted ad hoc disaster relief in various locations; however, until the mid 2000s when Indonesia was hit by a series of natural disasters, it did not conduct humanitarian relief operations as part of its institutional mission. Change occurred when two of Muhammadiah’s key constituent areas, Yogyakarta and Padang, were both struck by large-scale earthquakes. Following the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006, Muhammadiah members were emotionally
drawn to start humanitarian relief activities as part of its organizational mission (Latief 2010: 262–75). The Disaster Management Centre (Pusat Penanggulangan Bencana) was established in 2007 and in 2010 it was renamed the Disaster Management Institution (Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana).

**Nahdatul Ulama**

The responses of Nahdatul Ulama (NU) to disaster relief are rooted in its initial organizational responses to environmental and climate change. Illegal logging and deforestation started to negatively affect the area surrounding NU-affiliated Islamic boarding schools. In 2004, NU established a Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) unit, initially to work in partnership with various international organizations to mitigate disaster risk including coastal and environmental conservation. The CBDRM has expanded this partnership to include the Indonesian Government. In 2010, the unit was officially renamed the Institute for Disaster Response and Climate Change (Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim Nahdatul Ulama).  

What is noteworthy is the fact that these two major Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, officially developed specialized institutions for disaster management later than the other domestic religious organizations. They have, however, received much more attention and trust from international communities in terms of receiving funding. The problem deriving from the prominence of major faith-based organizations as humanitarian relief organizations is that the partnership formations are likely to be affected by general socio-religious conditions in Indonesia. We highlight two main factors below.

First, the recent rise of religious intolerance in Indonesia has made it more difficult for inter-faith partnerships to be formulated. Although Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and other religions are acknowledged and allowed to practice, Islam has never been declared the official state religion. Indonesia has gone through reform processes since 1998, supposedly meant to promote democracy, but one negative trend has been the increased intolerance for religious pluralism in the country. Attacks on minority religious groups have been on the rise, as exemplified by conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Maluku and Central Sulawesi in the early 2000s (see Sidel 2007). In addition, in 2005 the Indonesian Ulama Council issued an edict that prohibits inter-faith marriages, inter-faith prayers, and religious pluralism in Indonesia (Gillespie 2007). Although an edict does not have any binding effect and can be ignored, the issuing of such an edict strongly indicates that there is an increased level of intolerance for religious pluralism in Indonesia. Along with the rise of religious intolerance, some strongly Islamic regions have issued regional by-laws, such as those related to Muslim clothing and reading the Qur’an, and caning as punishment under Islamic criminal law, which seem to have been inspired by Islamic laws in Indonesia (Bush 2008).

Second, the use of the funds and programs is guided by religious interpretations. For example, according to traditional interpretations, only
Muslims can be the beneficiaries of Islamic zakat funds. The dominant interpretations make it difficult to undertake humanitarian programs to assist non-Muslims; although recently the National Islamic Zakat Management Board, BAZNAS, has offered a new interpretation that allows zakat funds to be used for non-Muslims who do not oppose the Muslim community. The use of zakat funds for non-Muslims remains controversial for the majority of Islamic organizations.

**Disaster coordination through case studies**

The state is an important actor in disaster emergencies; however, state capacities are limited in handling all aspects of needs for disaster management in a short period. Along with state agencies, there are CSOs and international agencies working for disaster relief. Effective disaster coordination involving CSOs is an important task for the state. We need to ask how effective the state is in coordinating with diverse CSOs and various government agencies. It is a challenging task, as trust between CSOs and the state in Indonesia has been generally weak, as mentioned. Through several disaster cases, we will identify problems prior to and after the implementation of the Law No. 24/2007 and the establishment of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in 2008.

**Disaster management prior to 2007**

It should be noted that before the Law No. 24/2007 was legislated, Indonesia had a disaster management agency named BAKORNAS PBP (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Pengungsian: the National Coordination Body for Disasters and Refugees). This institution was established after Indonesian independence and had survived in different forms and with different names (Hudawati 2003). BAKORNAS was originally established in 1979. Its main responsibility was to coordinate various government agencies, but it did not carry out disaster management operations on the ground. Under BAKORNAS, identifying which agency should take the leadership in an emergency remained unclear (Hudawati 2003: 75–81). This internal weakness became more serious with the introduction of regional autonomy in 2001, as both national and regional governments became involved in disaster management processes. Prior to 2007, disaster management was not a national priority and hence the government had limited resources. The consequences were felt especially during the Aceh tsunami of 26 December 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta, Central Java, on 27 May 2006.

**Lack of coordination**

The main task of BAKORNAS PBP was coordinating disaster management; however, the coordination was limited to the provision of information, without providing clear direction on how each stakeholder should act, independently or collaboratively. Schulze (2005) indicates that there was very poor coordination
amongst the various agencies involved in the Aceh tsunami disaster management. Indeed there were many but poorly coordinated meetings, mainly among government and international agencies to share information. BAKORNAS was not able to effectively organize coordination between government agencies and international agencies including UN-based agencies, and international and national CSOs (Schulze 2005: 7–9). Various reports of BAKORNAS PBP show that its coordination was focused only on international agencies and did not sufficiently acknowledge the role of CSOs. In the case of the Aceh tsunami in 2004, the vice-president led disaster management only for the emergency relief period (three months), because BAKORNAS PBP did not have the capacity to implement reconstruction work and to mitigate disaster risks. The National Government created the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi Aceh-Nias or BRR), which was authorized to create and implement policy. An independent and neutral body like BRR had proven to be more effective in relief reconstruction than BAKORNAS PBP (Mangkusubroto 2011).

After the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2004, BAKORNAS PBP did not function well in disaster management; the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reported that the local government in Yogyakarta had better planning and implementation capacities (ADB 2006). Local CSOs were relatively active in providing relief; however, neither international organizations nor the Indonesian Government actively pursued partnerships or provided resources to strengthen the capacity of local CSOs (MacRae and Hodgkin 2011).

Claims of corruption emerged as a result of ineffective coordination and lack of accountability in dispersing aid from donors (Schulze 2005). Aceh suffered from long political oppression by the Central Government, due to Islamic separatist movements. For about two decades under the New Order Government, civil society was suppressed under the enactment of the Military Operation Zone. This suppression later led to hostilities against the Indonesian Government. Therefore, during the tsunami relief operations, the Acehnese were reluctant to work in partnership with government agencies.

*Lack of inter-faith partnerships*

The aftermath of the tsunami relief in Aceh revealed the difficulties in forging inter-faith relief partnerships in emergency circumstances. Aceh is a strongly Islamic region where the majority of the population is conservative Muslim. Due to the flow of Christian international aid, the Acehnese Muslims had to interact with thousands of non-Muslims and foreigners. Suspicion and concerns rose among the Acehnese victims and Muslim Indonesian volunteers that the relief aid and foreign volunteers would change Acehnese Muslim culture. Islamic militia groups from Java working as volunteers criticized the presence of Westerners and Western troops in Aceh (Miller 2010: 36–7). Consequently, the Indonesian Government restricted assistance from foreign military (about 4,500 personnel from 11 countries) after the initial three months of emergency work, and allowed only non-military assistance for recovery programs.
Contrary to the situation in Aceh, in Yogyakarta, faith-based CSOs, such as Muhammadiyah, facilitated inter-faith partnerships for disaster relief. Approximately 9 per cent of the Yogyakarta population is non-Muslim and historically the city has had many students, social movements and CSOs. It has long been a tourist destination and people have grown accustomed to foreigners. In addition, inter-faith dialogue activities have been organized frequently since the early 1990s to promote mutual trust (Park 2008: 197–224). For example, during the 2006 disaster relief, Muhammadiyah collaborated with many international agencies, such as the Australian Agency for International Aid (AusAID), for the provision of health services, and Buddhist Korean communities for housing development in Sumberpuro, Yogyakarta.

**Disaster management after the Law No. 24/2007**

As the shortcomings of the government’s coordination capacity were exposed through the Aceh and Yogyakarta disasters, the legal reforms on disaster management gained strong support from various elements of Indonesian society. For example, the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia, MPBI), a civil society network established in 2003, had a leading role. It led the legal reform process that successfully created the Law No. 24/2007. MPBI’s members were mainly academics in disaster-related issues, journalists and CSO activists, who encouraged MPBI to focus on conceptual and strategic works. International agencies also provided extensive support for this legislation (BNPB-UNDP Indonesia 2010: 7).

The significance of the Law No. 24/2007 is that it has effectively provided a new paradigm for looking at disaster management in Indonesia. First, it indicates that the emphasis has moved from disaster management to disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Second, it stresses the importance of good governance in disaster management, which includes the principles of accountability and transparency to avoid corruption. Third, it acknowledges people’s rights to access information on disaster risk awareness and protection, as well as how to obtain cash benefits, compensation and loans to assist with disaster recovery. Fourth, it indicates concerns about the problems associated with climate change. Finally, it recognizes and engages with non-government efforts – namely, international agencies and business institutions. This law fails, however, to mention CSOs categorically, which is ironic, as a civil society network spearheaded the process of legal reform that resulted in the creation of Law No. 24/2007. Based on this law, in 2008 the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and its regional agencies for disaster management were created. As an independent, non-ministerial body under the president, it replaced the BAKORNAS PBP. While BAKORNAS PBP could not directly manage or mitigate disasters, this new ‘super’ body covers disaster mitigation, disaster-relief activities, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This body and its operations receive much financial support from central and local governments.

After its inception in 2008, BNPB did set many regulations and guidelines, and formed Regional Bodies for Disaster Management (Badan Penanggulangan...
Bencana Daerah, BPBD) in almost all provinces in 2009. This rapid development is due to the strong support of MPBI and international agencies for legal reforms in disaster management. Legal reforms have had a positive impact in disaster risk reduction in Indonesia. Disaster risk reduction has become an important security issue for the Indonesian Government. For example, in July 2010 the government launched a campaign to have ‘a million schools and hospitals safe from disaster’ in partnership with many government agencies and CSOs.11 The government reinforced a program called TAGANA, comprising community-based Youth Groups for Disaster Preparedness (Taruna Siaga Bencana), located in various districts and provinces (Gunawan and Amalia 2009).

In the following sections, we will analyse the impact of Law No. 24/2007 and the BNPB in two recent disaster management case studies – namely, the Situ Gintung dam burst and resulting flood on the outskirts of Jakarta (2009), and the Mount Merapi volcanic eruptions (2010).12 We will analyse how existing networks and trust at the grassroots level have contributed to immediate disaster-relief responses.

**Better coordination and management?**

Contrary to government evaluation reports, the BNPB struggled in its management of 25 natural disasters in 2010.13 There was a lack of coordination among government agencies and offices in dealing with disaster relief (Sagita 2010). For example, BNPB was slow to decide whether a disaster was categorized as national or local. The disaster management of the Mount Merapi volcanic eruption was hindered by the change of its status from a local disaster (managed by BPBD) to a national one (managed by BNPB). A small-scale disaster in Situ Gintung was coordinated by BNPB, as a local BPBD was not yet active. As a result of limited coordination, the situation in Situ Gintung area became chaotic with the involvement of CSOs, government agencies, and political parties. As the disaster took place just ten days before the national election in 2009, the disaster area became a political campaign site.

Coordination of CSOs by the BNPB remained absent in Situ Gintung, leaving the CSOs to take the initiative. For example, CSOs under the leadership of DD created the Situ Gintung Forum for Disaster Relief Management, targeting better coordination as a priority. The forum coordinated aid among small CSOs, while BNPB facilitated cash and housing from government agencies, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs and the local government of South Tangerang.

The case of the Merapi disaster also shows that the BNPB’s coordination remains limited and is intended mainly to coordinate central and local government agencies. Analyses of BNPB’s reports and documents revealed a lack of initiative to engage with local CSOs (BNPB *et al.* 2009). In the case of the Merapi eruptions, BNPB was viewed as too dominant in its relief work, too bureaucratic and neglectful of local authorities. Apart from lack of BNPB capacity, existing sectoral ‘ownership’ among government agencies further complicated
the coordination of relief efforts. As coordination remained poor, the abundant supply of assistance and relief goods did not strengthen the capacity-building of disaster management. In Situ Gintung, excess aid led to corruption, especially by Neighbourhood Associations (Rukun Tetangga, RTs) and Groups of Neighbourhood Associations (Rukun Warga, RWs), which had limited capacity to manage donations. An interview with a local leader, Muhammad Rosyid, concludes that strong leadership of local community leaders and existing strong social ties between the leaders and community members had, on the other hand, prevented corruption.

In order to address this issue, at the time of the Padang earthquake in 2009, BNPB introduced a grassroots system of community groups (kelompok masyarakat – pokmas), which is a new mechanism for government assistance that directly targets victims. Each pokmas consists of victims who receive assistance from a facilitator in the management of government aid. To avoid bureaucratization and corruption, BNPB transfers cash directly into the bank accounts of pokmas leaders, avoiding local government offices. This mechanism proved effective, but also time-consuming to implement in the aftermath of a disaster when immediate relief is needed. In sum, we argue that the presence of BNPB has not made a significant change in coordination and engagement with CSOs for capacity-building.

Strengthening faith-based and inter-faith partnerships

Although instances of CSO involvement in disaster relief are, arguably, too few for the government and the BNPB to acknowledge, international agencies have started to form partnerships with faith-based CSOs in Indonesia. For example, AusAID has been collaborating with Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center and NU Center for Disaster Management and Climate Change to help relief works in Padang and capacity-building in Merapi (AusAID n.d.).

In Situ Gintung, the Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (also affected by the disaster) provided assistance with search and rescue, public kitchens, temporary shelters, and recovery programs in education and the economy for the victims. The local branch of Aisyiyah, a women’s organization under Muhammadiyah in the affected area, provided economic assistance for victims, and scholarships for children of the victims. These types of assistance were offered not only in the Situ Gintung area, but also in Padang and Yogyakarta, well before the Law No. 24/2007; however, in recognizing the importance of disaster relief and risk mitigation, both Muhammadiyah and NU each created a separate division in their organizations to focus on disaster management.

Faith-based CSOs faced challenges in collaborating with other different faith organizations in disaster relief, but succeeded in tackling sensitive issues and reactions against their work. For example, the Central Board of the Islamic Students’ Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) in Jakarta was reported to have received donations for disaster relief in Padang from Israeli students in Canada and Singapore (Sabili Cyber 2009). Muhammadiyah Disaster Management
Center (MDMC) reportedly collaborated with the Israeli Red Cross in 2008 for disaster relief. Although both organizations were criticized by other Islamic organisations, such as the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), both organizations persisted in their inter-faith work. Locally, the issue of aid delivery became controversial because it is tied to faith. In contrast, the MDMC and Islamic Students’ Association locate aid for disaster relief as a humanitarian endeavour.

The existence of strong inter-faith activities has proved to be effective in disaster-relief efforts in multi-religious and multi-ethnic areas. For example, The Brotherhood Forum for Faithful Community (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, FPUB), established in 1997 by 12 religious leaders from Yogyakarta, organized a series of workshops involving religious communities, intellectuals and government officials as a response to the 1998 riots in Jakarta (Park 2008). FPUB also publishes an inter-faith magazine, Suluh, which featured a story on the Merapi evacuation and inter-faith humanitarian activities. Inter-faith connections and relations proved to be effective in easing tensions caused by hardline Muslims around the issue of Muslims taking shelter at a GKI church in Gejayan, Yogyakarya. Furthermore, misunderstanding took place when Christian organizations allegedly refused to receive prayer-related garments and carpets for their Muslim refugees. These small incidents did not evolve into a larger conflict, as generally good relations exist among inter-faith leaders, facilitated by FPUB.17 In this sense, local inter-faith linkages were successful, in this case, in preventing civil unrest.

The initiatives to form inter-faith partnerships for disaster relief have, however, come from religious CSOs and international agencies, not directly from the government. An example is the formation of the Indonesian Humanitarian Forum, which is part of the (international) Humanitarian Forum. In 2004, the British Red Cross, Islamic Relief and Oxfam, as well as several European organizations, founded the International Forum for Cooperation for Humanitarian Relief and Development. The forum has conducted workshops in 13 countries with predominantly Muslim populations (The Humanitarian Forum n.d.). Responding to this, the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI) was established in 2008 and was involved in the coordination of the relief efforts in the Padang earthquake in 2009. To date, the meetings were largely held among CSO members in Jakarta. Humanitarian Forum Indonesia has great potential for religious CSOs to foster working partnerships and to solve various issues related to inter-faith conflicts. How this organization could develop by engaging a variety of other organizations remains to be seen.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the role of the state and civil society in disaster relief in Indonesia. We have identified two factors constraining the potential for state–civil society partnerships for disaster relief. First, the Indonesian Government has not focused on harnessing partnerships with CSOs, in general. This situation
has resulted in ineffective coordination of CSOs by the state agencies. Second, lack of inter-faith partnerships has also hampered the formation of partnerships for disaster-relief operations among different faiths. Although inter-faith partnerships were initiated by the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, efforts to include other stakeholders (for example, academics and international organizations) as members have yet to materialize.

Our case studies in Indonesia have shown that causes of failure in forming stronger partnerships, either between CSOs and the government agencies, or among CSOs themselves, derive from the poor functioning of social capital. A lack of trust between CSOs and government agencies and an absence of existing social networks across different CSOs have made immediate disaster responses and cooperation less effective; however, our findings from Situ Gintung and the Padang earthquake disasters also have shown that in certain places where social capital such as trust, norms and networks functioned strongly, CSOs were able to form limited but operational partnerships with other external relief agencies. This has resulted in minimizing corruption during the relief work. This chapter concurs with the recent studies by Aldrich (2012) and Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) that show that communities that have strong civil society traditions are better in responding to and enhancing disaster-relief operations. Well-functioning social capital therefore contributes to the process of building resilience and to speeding up the post-disaster recovery.

This chapter shows that the establishment of the Law No. 24/2007 and an official agency, BNPB, is an important step towards achieving desired outcomes for disaster-relief management in Indonesia; however, active engagement to form partnerships with various types of CSOs, including FBOs, is essential. BNPB is aware that it needs to improve coordination and promote community involvement in disaster prevention (BNPB 2010: 10), and our analysis of case studies shows that it needs to make further efforts. Closer relationships and partnerships between government agencies and CSOs are key factors in achieving effective disaster relief. Consideration of these issues may lead to a more inclusive approach by Indonesian Government policymakers for disaster management and risk mitigation.

Notes:

1 The Hyogo Framework for Action is a ten-year plan to make the world safer by reducing losses deriving from disasters. It was adopted by 168 member states of the United Nations in 2005 (www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037, accessed 11 May 2012).

2 See, for example, RestoreYourEconomy.org, a project funded by the US Economic Development Administration (EDA), which lists these four phases as critical in disaster management: http://restoreyoreconomy.org/disaster-overview/phases-of-disaster/ (accessed 27 March 2013).

3 At that time the term used was non-governmental organizations (NGOs, or Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat), which means the same as the term CSOs.

4 A similar situation started emerging in South Africa after 1994, the start of the post-apartheid era. Islam had been banned since pre-apartheid colonial times. Islamic
groups in South Africa are now starting to promote zakat to fund social and economic
development initiatives for the poor.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to summarize faith-based organizations involved
in humanitarian relief efforts. We have limited our coverage to organizations that
have been involved in recent large-scale disasters in Indonesia, such as the Aceh
tsunami and the Mount Merapi eruptions.

7 The name was BAKORNAS PBA (National Coordination Body for Natural Disaster).
   In 1990 it changed to focus on all disasters (BAKORNAS PB), and in 2001 changed
to focus on disaster and refugees (BAKORNAS PBP)(Hudawati 2003: 36–55).
8 Under regional autonomy, each province and district has the right, authority and obli-
gation to manage and organize their own households including selection of heads of
provinces and districts, transportation, public infrastructure, and forestry. Foreign
policy, defence and security, the judiciary, monetary and fiscal policies are not
included under regional autonomy.
9 The Aceh tsunami killed about 169,000 people, turned 500,000 people into refugees,
   and devastated 80 per cent of the infrastructure in the Aceh area and nearby islands,
   with an estimated total economic damage of US$4.5 billion. The Yogyakarta-Central
   Java earthquake brought severe damage to nine districts, killed 3,752 people, injured
   37,923 people, and damaged 624,220 houses. It also made 1.5 million people home-
   less, and the estimated economic damages and losses were US$3.1 billion.
10 For example, non-governmental agencies have not been mentioned in BAKORNAS
11 www.berita-ramlah.net/berita-dan-mengiatan/32-website-kampanye-1-juta-sekolah-
12 The Mount Merapi volcanic eruptions killed 353 people, caused Rp7.3 trillion
   (US$813 million) in economic losses and forced 350,000 people to evacuate. Many
   people died because of dreadful pyroclastic (hot ash) flows. Compared with the cases
   mentioned above, the Situ Gintung case is small. The Gintung dam burst created a
   ‘little tsunami’. As a consequence, 100 people died, 321 houses, including a prayer-
house and preschool, were destroyed, 150 houses were damaged, and about 1,300
   people were displaced.
13 www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/news/2010/04/20/91732/Waduh,-25-Bencana-Alam-
15 Interview with Muhammad Rosyid, by Amelia Fauzia, April 2009.
17 Interview with Muhamin, chairperson of FPUB, by Minako Sakai, June 2011.

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Rehabilitation and Reconciliation of West Sumatra: www.rehabrekon.org.

RestoreYourEconomy.org: http://restoreyoureconomy.org/disaster-overview/phases-of-disaster/.

Satu juta sekolah dan rumah sakit aman [One million schools and hospitals safe]: www.berikrar-aman.net.