CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix

1. Introduction 1

2. Conceptualizing and Measuring Piety 27

3. Islam and Party Politics 60

4. Islam and the Market 97

5. Islam and the World 125

6. Conclusion 159

Appendix: Constructing Our Survey 173

References 177

Index 189
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

John Esposito and John Voll’s signature book Islam and Democracy opens with a stark observation: “Religious resurgence and democratization are two of the most important developments of the final decades of the twentieth century” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 3). More than twenty years later the same observation holds true. Across the Muslim world, religion plays an increasingly prominent role in both the private and the public lives of over a billion people. Observers of these changes, in turn, struggle to understand the consequences of an Islamic resurgence in a democratizing world. Will democratic political participation by an increasingly religious population lead to victories by Islamists at the ballot box? Will more conspicuously pious Muslims participate in politics and markets in a fundamentally different way than they had previously? Will a renewed attention to Islam lead Muslim democracies to re-evaluate their place in the global
INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of piety among Indonesian Muslims, beginning with a conceptual discussion of what piety means and then describing how we operationalize piety in our survey. Our conceptual treatment of piety as an individual-level phenomenon is a unique contribution to a growing literature on comparative public opinion in the Muslim world that has produced a range of useful empirical findings (Blaydes and Linzer 2008, 2012; Fish 2011; Furia and Lucas 2008; Jamal 2006; Pepinsky and Welborne 2011; Tessler 2002, 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012), but which is nevertheless marked by a lack of attention to the conceptual foundations of what it means to be pious and how piety might be captured in public opinion data. We then use the original measure of piety that we develop out of this conceptual discussion to provide a fresh perspective on questions that have long animated scholars of religion in Indonesia,
Islam and Party Politics

INTRODUCTION

In chapter 2, we showed that there is a relatively weak relationship between individual piety and beliefs about the importance of Islam in Indonesian politics, either in terms of Islam playing a greater role in politics or in terms of implementing sharia law on a regional or national scale. But these only scratch the surface of how piety correlates with political beliefs.

In this chapter, we ask if political parties that espouse Islamist party ideologies enjoy an electoral advantage over non-Islamist parties when they compete in free and open democratic elections.

This question has a long pedigree in the scholarship on Islam and democracy, motivated by a common belief among many observers of Islamist opposition movements in authoritarian states that Islamists would win any election in which they were able to compete. While the causal logic for
INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we showed that piety plays a highly circumscribed role in explaining support for Islamist parties. The key issue that we confronted is that many Islamist parties also campaign on populist and reformist platforms, which makes it hard to disentangle religion from reformism as determinants of party support. In this chapter we shift our attention to Islamic banking, in order to examine whether individual piety shapes the way Indonesian Muslims participate in the contemporary market economy.

At first glance, the switch from Islamist party support to Islamic banking may seem jarring. Yet there are useful parallels between the two. Each is an individual choice (to support an Islamist party or not; to choose Islamic financial products or not); each occupies a contested space among Muslim thinkers, in which there is consensus neither on the theological
Islam and the World

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we showed that the orientation of Indonesian Muslims toward the Muslim world is a powerful predictor of their use of Islamic financial products. We interpreted this result as indicating that Muslims with a cosmopolitan, globalized Muslim identity are more likely to act in ways that are consistent with the maintenance of that identity. That conclusion rests on an implicit assumption that the relevant global community with whom Indonesian Muslims identify is the Muslim world. Yet we are well aware that throughout Indonesian history, relations with other global communities—for example, with the Western world, or with China—have been just as important as relations with the Muslim world.

In this chapter we set our sights on Indonesia’s place in the world, and ask how Islamic revivalism shapes Indonesians’ preferences for engagement with other kinds of communities. Indonesia is a particularly useful
The bulk of the survey data that we employ in this book comes from a single, large, nationally representative survey that we conducted in 2008. Here, we describe how we implemented this survey and give a basic overview of the demographic characteristics of the respondents. These give us confidence that these results are broadly representative of the entire Indonesian population.

We constructed our sample frame via a multistage random sampling technique. We began with the national census to stratify our sample by the percentage of the national population living in each of Indonesia's thirty-three provinces and the percentage classified as urban or rural in each province. This gives the stratification weight for each province $i$ as $w_i$ with $\sum_i w_i = 1$. The number of respondents drawn from each province is accordingly $w_i \cdot n$, where $n$ is the sample size (2,548). Within each province, we also take from the census an exhaustive list of all inhabited places (desa/kelurahan), which serve as the primary sampling unit. (Desa corresponds to village, while kelurahan is roughly equivalent to an urban ward.) We impose that ten respondents will be drawn from each desa/kelurahan, so we choose at random $\frac{w_i \cdot n}{10}$ desa/kelurahan from each province, stratified by the percentage of that province's population that is classified as urban or rural.

In each selected village and ward we obtained a list of neighborhoods (rukun tetangga), which we further sampled randomly, choosing five rukun tetangga from each desa/kelurahan. Survey teams then obtained
“This book does a great job laying out the ways in which piety shapes Indonesian views and orientations towards politics, markets, and the globe. The strength of the book is that it showcases contextual nuance to better illuminate the influence of Islam in Indonesian politics and society. The book relies on a remarkable amount of data and rigorous analyses. It is extremely well-researched.”

—AMANEY A. JAMAL, Princeton University

“In Piety and Public Opinion, three leading political scientists show that impressions can deceive; they find that Muslim identity generally fails to predict Indonesians’ political and economic behavior. This book is a model of how problem-driven, data-rich political science can advance our understanding of pressing real-world issues.”

—M. STEVEN FISH, author of Are Muslims Distinctive?

“Piety and Public Opinion upends conventional thinking on the relationship between individual religiosity and public life among Muslims. Through an entirely original analysis of public opinion in Indonesia, the authors show us that personal piety counts much less than we would expect in critical areas of political, economic, and international engagement. The book makes a clarion call for deeper and more subtle thinking about how religious revivalism is reshaping the Islamic world.”

—EDWARD ASPINALL, author of Islam and Nation

“Lucid, engaging, and tightly argued throughout, Piety and Public Opinion discredits the common misperception that support for political Islam, the use of Islamic financial services, and engagement with the Muslim world are all grounded in individual piety. Using rich survey data, the authors show that among Indonesian Muslims, these are actually determined by non-religious factors. The book’s findings are relevant to the entire Muslim world and carry major implications for the study of how religion interacts with politics, economics, and social life.”

—TIMUR KURAN, Duke University