UNITED STATES EXIT STRATEGY FOR LEAVING IRAQ 2011-2013

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Bachelor of Arts in International Relations

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ABSTRACT

This research analyses the effectiveness of the United States exit strategy in the post its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. The period under scrutiny is 2011 and beyond. Then, there are three indicators being employed in analyzing this issue, which are (1) domestic security; (2) political stability; and (3) economy. Based on R. Caplan, the three indicators are essential requirements for the effectiveness of exit strategy, as well as to establish consolidated peace in the post military operations.

In 2009, the U.S. President, Barack Obama marked the end of Iraq war after nearly nine-year war. Before ultimately withdrawing the U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. has run mode and mechanism to manage its transition process. The transition process is including security, politic, and economy. Obama set date to end the U.S. combat mission in Iraq by gradually pulling all troops out in between 2009 and 2011. This was done to ensure a stable and self-reliant Iraq.

Considering all the three sectors (security, politic, and economy) above, this thesis argues that the U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq is not effective. The U.S. exit strategy did not meet with three interconnected indicators that have been mention above. Iraq is still experiencing crisis, including security, political, and economy after the U.S. leaving from Iraq. The U.S. failed to leave behind a legacy of stability and to inherit consolidated peace in Iraq beyond 2011.

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By the grace of Allah the Most Merciful

All praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds
and peace and blessings be upon His revered Prophets and Messengers

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<tr>
<td>AABs</td>
<td>Advise-and-Assist Brigades</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>Iraq Body Count</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraq Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Joint Camp Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMOCC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>OND</td>
<td>Operation New Dawn</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Security Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>United States Forces-Iraq</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Problem Statement

Obama’s exit strategy from Iraq would mark an end of Iraq war, nearly nine-year war. The U.S. withdrew all its troops from Iraq in 2011 which was fulfilled one of Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign promises and allowed the White House to focus more on economic at home.\(^1\) The starting point after six weeks in office, Obama set date to end Iraq combat mission that planed by pulling all troops out gradually by the end of 2011 except for some soldiers attached to the U.S. Embassy.\(^2\) The goal of U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq is sustainable peace, stable, and self-reliant for Iraq, post U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and beyond.\(^3\)

However, the problem was after the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, Iraq yet remained in a fragile condition, such as hit by almost daily series bomb attacked kill dozens of people. Wave of violence raised the prospect of tensions between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia communities that continued to

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\(^3\) The JCP base document, USF-I and U.S. Embassy Baghdad, 2010 Joint Campaign Plan, November 23, 2009, p. 16
widespread. Ideally, after U.S. left from Iraq, Iraq must be done without leaving Iraq to slip again into chaos and even a sectarian war.

In order to find the effectiveness of U.S. exit strategy beyond 2011, it is necessary to first elucidate the initial reasoning behind the Obama’s exit strategy decision. The U.S. withdrew from Iraq due to President Obama was an early opponent of the Iraq war and Obama administration’s foreign policy priorities shifted from the Middle East to East Asia. Obama has vowed to focus and to expand U.S. military in the Asia Pacific as a top priority rather than in the Middle East.

After nearly nine years, America’s war in Iraq would be over, the last decision President Obama declared in White House on October 21, 2011 that he would withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year. The U.S. combat mission was over, which was ending talks for an extended deployment with Baghdad. Obama made the announcement at the White House shortly after conferring with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a secure video conference between Washington and Baghdad. Over the next two months after announcement the U.S. military presence in Iraq stands at just under 40,000 – down from a peak of 165,000 in 2008.

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5 Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America's moment?,” International Affairs 89: 2 (March 2013) p. 299.
7 Obama: All U.S. Forces to Leave Iraq by End of 2011 [on-line media]; available at http://london.usembassy.gov/obama222.html; accessed on October 4, 2013
Actually, Obama have been declared exit strategy since August 2010 that the combat mission had ended, but had kept his options open until October 2011 on whether the U.S. military presence would extend in some other capacities. At last, official announcement in October 2011 Obama told to the Washington Post that 10,000 of troops as the first phase withdrawal will pack up their gear and board convoys for the journey home.  

Associated Press (AP) also reported that the U.S. would not keep troops in Iraq beyond 2011, except for some soldiers attached to the U.S. Embassy. Denis McDonough, the White House's deputy national security adviser, said that in addition to the standard Marine security detail, the U.S. will also have 4,000 to 5,000 military forces to provide security for American diplomats, including at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and U.S. consulates in Basra and Erbil.

In addition, the decision ends, one of America's longest wars, due to unsuccessful negotiations with Iraqi government. The Iraqi leaders refused to give U.S. troops immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts. Therefore, the U.S. refused to allow its troops to stay without that guarantee.

Based on the evaluation during the U.S. presence in Iraq 2003-2009, firstly, AP counted as of 2009, at least 4,251 members of the U.S. military had

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died in the Iraq war since the war began in March 2003. Total Iraqi deaths were unknown but number in perhaps above 100,000.\textsuperscript{10}

Secondly, the military operation was also too expensive. It was not match with the benefit gained by U.S. There are 39,000 U.S. troops in Iraq as of 2011. From the beginning of operations through July 31, 2011, the Defense Department has obligated $704.6 billion for the Iraq war. The monthly cost of the war was about $3.8 billion and jumped to $120 billion a year. Those costs have risen in importance as a divided U.S. government struggles to contain its soaring debt.\textsuperscript{11} All these administration evaluation results reported that American presence in Iraq is actually hurting the U.S. interests. Therefore, the administration decided to leave Iraq following evaluated the relative costs, risks, and benefits of exiting versus staying.

However, Obama’s exit strategy was too risky. Ending the U.S. presence in Iraq, there were no assurances for long term peace and stable across the country. Pulling out of Iraq must be done without leaving Iraq to slip again into chaos and even a sectarian war, but the available evidence seems to suggest that series of attack, such as bombing and shooting, has become almost a daily occurrence. CNN reported for June 18, 2013 that instability ahead of the first elections, since U.S. troops left the country in


2011, occurred a string of attacks across central Iraq on Monday killed at least a dozen people and wounded more than 50 others.\textsuperscript{12} The violence targeted to security forces, police and others to cast votes ahead of provincial elections in the coming days.

The string of bombings and shooting also attacked on police guarding an oil pipeline killed four and wounded five. NBC News reported that nearly 2,000 Iraqis have been killed in sectarian violence since April 2013. April 2013 has been the deadliest causalities in Iraq since 2008, when the U.S. led occupation and counterinsurgency campaign was in full swing.\textsuperscript{13}

The tension escalates into civil war between Iraq's majority Shia and minority Sunni. Ali A. Nabhan\textsuperscript{14} acknowledges that no one claimed responsibility for the attacks, which wounded at least 274, but the barrage of mostly car bombings focused on Shia areas, raising suspicions that the increasingly powerful Islamic State of Iraq, the country's al Qaeda franchise, planned the attacks to further inflame sectarian tensions. The al Qaeda-backed violence has formed a pattern of targets, striking mostly at Shia politicians and civilians and moderate Sunni partners of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shia backed government.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} A special Middle East contributor for Associated Press (AP)

From the above explanation, the U.S. withdrawal was such as two sides of the same coin. One side, during the U.S. presence in Iraq, there have been thousands of U.S. military deaths, military assistant in Iraq was costly, as well as recover U.S. domestic economy was a priority. On the other side, the absence of U.S. presence in Iraq, the situation could get worse. Iraqi civilians continued to get caught in terrorist and cross-sectarian attacks on a daily basis. So, the effectiveness of U.S. exit strategy post U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is still blurring. Given that, an observation and research is required to prove whether U.S. exit strategy post U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is effective or not. The research will give contribution to the body of regional studies in Middle East.

B. Research Question

The goal of U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq is that U.S. leaves behind stable and self-reliant Iraq. The hope for Iraq after U.S. left, Iraq must be done without leaving Iraq to slip again into chaos and even a sectarian conflict. Yet, given the current situation after the U.S. left from Iraq, Iraq could get worse; the level of violence has risen. Iraq slipped again into sectarian conflict and reemergence of terrorism group. One of consideration is whether exit strategy which is kind of successful story under the current situation in Iraq. With this problem statement, come up a research question: How effective is the U.S. exit strategy in the post its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011?
In this research, the initial assumption is the U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq is not quite effective. The focus measurement of the effectiveness of exit strategy is only assessed beyond 2011, which is the post U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Then, the specific criteria for measurement are through the effect of the exit strategy employed, especially in relation to consolidated peace post U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. A consolidated peace is a self-sustaining peace. The assessments of progress toward a consolidated peace base on three interconnected sets of requirements: (1) domestic basic security; (2) political stability; and (3) the creation of conditions for economic and social well-being.

C. Research Objective and Benefit

This research objective is analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. exit strategy in the post its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and beyond.

Then, there are three main benefits of research. Firstly, the research gives useful information to the International Relation observer. Second, contribute to the development of IR study as well as onto the body of regional studies in Middle East and Iraq. Last, bring benefit for student who intent to explore more all about U.S. and Iraq.

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16 Exit Strategy is a transitional plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing from a state, ideally having attained the goals. It is also as a process of transition rather than a single moment or event.
D. Literature Review

There had several works that examined on the issue of U.S. approach in Middle East either under Bush administration or Obama administration, and also about Iraq War that nearly nine-year. In this research paper uses the literature as a foundation and as support for a new insight that contribute to the ongoing research.

In some studies have shown that in International Affairs Journal volume 89, 2013 with the title The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America’s moment that written by Fawaz A. Gerges describe that when Obama begins his second term, this article takes stock of his foreign policy approach towards the Middle East. It lays out three big arguments. First, claiming that he fully accepts the basic realist premises informing American foreign policy; he has adopted a centrist–realist approach towards the region, an approach consistent with the dominant U.S. foreign policy orientation. Secondly despite Obama’s lofty rhetoric about a new start in relations between the U.S. and Muslim countries, the Middle East does not rank very high on his agenda. Putting America’s fiscal house in order and renewing its long-term economic strength were Obama’s priorities in his first term. That meant reducing the nation’s commitments abroad in the Middle East, where they had extended beyond vital national interests. Finally, Obama deeply understood the country’s desire to restore balance in domestic and international politics and shifted focus to the home front. From the outset, Obama has been shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities away from the Middle
East to the Pacific and Asia where he and his aides believe that America's future lies. Finally, the article argues that the U.S. finds that at the beginning of the end of its hegemonic moment in the Middle East.

Then, in certain book written by Amitav Acharya (2011), Beyond Iraq: the future of world order, in general, the author lay out on his book that the Iraq War would affect the future world order, kinds of problems has this war brought about, and something needed to learn these problems. Importantly, the Iraq War has caused numerous long-term security and economic problems in Iraq and in the Middle East. In addition, this war represents a failure of the Western liberals' project of establishing a political and liberal market democracy, and these liberals are likely to repeat the same error elsewhere in the future. Moreover, the war underlines the crisis in global governance today, but the idea of reforming the United Nations has some serious limitations. With regard to the issue of terrorism, Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been operating in the field for some time up until now, and thus Iraq will likely remain an important global center of terrorism in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, by Laily Fitriah (2007) with the title Faktor-faktor yang mempercepat kebijakan Pemerintah George W. Bush atas rencana penarikan pasukan AS di Irak, the research discusses about the factors under President George W. Bush that have planned for United States forces withdrawal from Iraq. While in 2007, the U.S. has suffered the economic crisis and inflation as well as U.S. has issued such as over budgeting for its invasion in Iraq. In addition, changing of political atmosphere also contributed to this condition
that Democratic Party succeeded to win the general election in 2006 and it has majority seats for Congress. The impact is George W. Bush found some obstacle in foreign policies especially toward Iraq. This is caused by Democratic is the party which is very opposite against the invasion of the U.S. to Iraq. Finally, it can be concluded that economic crisis, domestic political atmosphere, public opinion, and the involvement of international powers are the factors which George W. Bush on his plan of U.S. forces withdrawal from Iraq.

Finding differences from literature above are the major task for this paper will give the measure or assessing in order to evaluate the effectiveness post U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2011. Again, this paper need to answer, U.S. exit strategy’s measure of effectiveness post its withdrawal from Iraq that something has not been discussed. Moreover, most of those works about an approach dominant with U.S. foreign policy orientation still superficial or just discussed specific aspect of subject, but this research paper prescribes to a dissimilar view reflected the current dynamic developed issue within Iraq.

E. Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of analysis, the theoretical framework will be employed in order to describe the subject matter in a more clearly and structured manner. The study will use the concept of exit strategy. The theoretical framework has been mentioned as an important tool for the research to answer the research question that was raised in this thesis.
1. Exit Strategy Concept

Exit strategy is a transitional plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing from a state, ideally having attained the goals. Exit strategy could be understood as a process of transition rather than the single event of mission closure. The closure of state intervention or occupation has meant the end of international involvement in peace consolidation, as operation have been succeeded by mission that continue to exercise significant political authority and substitute indigenous governmental institutions.

Referring to Richard Caplan, mention on his book, “Exit Strategies and State Building” there are six exit mechanisms and modes of transition:

1. Cut and run. Where success is proving to be elusive and continued engagement costly, one option is to cut one's losses and scale back one's engagement significantly or withdraw from an operation entirely.
2. Phased withdrawal. Another option is a phased exit, the pace of withdrawal often being commensurate with the achievement of partial results (targets) culminating in the desired end state. And also transferring of responsibility for the maintenance of security in Iraq.
3. Deadlines. The timetable for transition or exit may be determined in advance and stipulated in a peace agreement.
4. Benchmarking. Recent practice has seen the increased use of benchmarking as mechanism to measure progress toward the achievement of state-building goals in effort to facilitate the planning and implementation of transitional and exit strategies. Benchmarks are reestablished standard of achievement, the attainment of which is expected to contribute to the realization of an operation's objective.
5. Election. Often used to effect transitions leading ultimately to a drawdown in state-building operations, elections are also an important instrument of peace consolidation. Moreover, elections are central to the establishment or (reestablishment) of governmental institutions.
6. Successor operations. Consistent with the view that transition is a process and not an event, there has been growing recognition of the
importance of successor peace operations and follow-on arrangements to consolidate peace.\textsuperscript{17}

The main conceptual premise of exit strategy is “a transitional plan for the disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties from a state or territory.” Ideally, the external parties, who conduct invasion, have achieved their principal on post-conflict state-building before final withdrawal phase. The achievement of principal on post-conflict state-building is having relation with a successful of exit strategy that is leaves behind a consolidated peace.\textsuperscript{18}

Furthermore, if referring to United Nations’ definition, a consolidated peace is a self-sustaining peace. It could be characterized not only the absence of military conflict in a state, but also the absence of some threats to public security, such as political repression and discrimination toward minority, ethnic, sect, religion group, widespread of violence, and so on.\textsuperscript{19}

Still following from the previous point, as Caplan mention in his book, the specific criteria for measuring an effectiveness and successful exit strategy is existence of consolidated peace that meets with three interconnected sets: “(1) the establishment and maintenance of basic security; (2) the development of effective and legitimate governance institutions and the rule of law; and (3) the creation of conditions for economic and social well-being.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 287
\textsuperscript{20} Caplan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 288.
F. Research Methods

This research will use qualitative method instead of quantitative method. According to Carmines and Zeller, qualitative method is a research methodology in which the outcome of the research is not produced through statistical procedures or other numeric form.\textsuperscript{21} The purpose of qualitative method is trying to describe systematically the facts, objects or subjects being investigated appropriately.\textsuperscript{22}

Qualitative method has two ways to obtain the data, namely primary data and secondary data. Primary data is the data which obtained directly from the original source without going through an intermediary medium. Primary data can be a subjective subject (person) individually or in groups, and direct observation of objects, activities or events and test results.\textsuperscript{23}

This study will seek secondary data which is the data obtained through books, thesis, online journals, printed journals, magazines, government publications, electronic media, and newspapers. Besides writer’s personal book collection, this study is also using lecturer’s collection. It gets the articles from reliable media such as The Jakarta Post, Media Indonesia, the VOA News, CNN, the Washington Post, Aljazeera, and Gulf News, while journals are attained from Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, the Middle East Institute, Middle East Policy Council, and so on. Besides, the writer gets the secondary data from library research

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 37.
from several sources that including the American Corner library, Jakarta Library of Congress (U.S. Embassy in Jakarta Library), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia library, Center Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) library, and the Internet.

In addition, to support the secondary data we seek the data through in-depth interviews with senior officials of U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia who are related and understand about the research’s topic. It also gets primary data from interviewing one of researcher in CSIS in Jakarta.

Understanding the title of this study, the main concern is around about United States exit strategy and its effectiveness for leaving Iraq in 2011. Therefore, this study will first classify them and find any data discussing each concern, answering what, when and how in general. The data should come from various sources since it is necessary to verify that the data is reliable.

In the beginning of the research, this study reveals U.S. troops withdrawal gradually, and the effectiveness of applied exit strategy in case of Iraq War in 2011 will be used, while other, if necessary, will only be supporting data. Meanwhile, this study should also seek more and verify the data on the reasons for U.S. reason to withdrawal troops from Iraq, in order to find out the answer of the research questions above.
G. Outline

Chapter I: INTRODUCTION

A. Problem Statement
B. Research Question
C. Research Objective and Benefit
D. Literature Review
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F. Research Methods
G. Outline

Chapter II: U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

A. U.S. Presence in Iraq
C. Barack Obama Withdrawal Plan

Chapter III: U.S. EXIT STRATEGY IN IRAQ

A. The Modes and Mechanisms of U.S. Exit Strategy in Iraq
B. The Transition Process in Iraq over U.S. Exit Strategy
   1. Security Transition
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Chapter IV: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. EXIT STRATEGY FROM IRAQ

A. Domestic Security Condition
B. Political Stability
C. National Economic and Social Well-Being

Chapter V: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER II

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

A. U.S. Presence in Iraq

In the end of 2011 United States withdrew all remaining troops from Iraq, asserting that war in Iraq officially ended, nearly nine-year. The Iraq War was consisted of two periods. The first period (March 20-May 1, 2003) was an invasion of Iraq starting on by an invasion force led by the U.S. that led to overthrow the Ba’ath Party government of Saddam Hussein. The second period (2003-2011) was a military occupation period. It was marked by along and violent conflict between Iraqi insurgent\(^\text{24}\) and U.S. led forces.\(^\text{25}\)

The first period of war, which was known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, was begun on March 20, 2003 when U.S.-led coalition forces\(^\text{26}\) invaded Iraq. The U.S. carried out invasion into Iraq to destroy Iraqi Weapon Mass Destruction (WMD) and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein.\(^\text{27}\)

Prior to the war, two days before invasion, Bush issued an ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein and his family to leave Iraq within 48 hours or face

\(^{24}\) The composition of Iraqi Insurgency: (1) Ba’athist--the supporters of Saddam Hussein, (2) Iraqi nationalists, (3) Iraqi Salafi Islamists, (4) Shi’a militias, (5) Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance, and (6) Jihadist that related to al-Qaeda.


\(^{26}\) Four countries participated on coalition force, included Australia, Poland, United Kingdom, and United States.

\(^{27}\) Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 41
military action.\textsuperscript{28} At the same time, the governments of the U.S. and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of WMD that created a threat to their security and that of their allies.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore the priority of Coalition mission was to disarm Iraqi WMD, then to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism.\textsuperscript{30} Again, the government of U.S. and U.K. strongly believed that Iraq kept WMD. However, later Iraqi WMD has not been found in Iraq after U.S. forces invaded Iraq.\textsuperscript{31}

At the peak of the war, about three weeks into the invasion, U.S. led Coalition forces moved into Baghdad and took control of Iraq's capital city. The falls of Baghdad followed by topple a statue of Saddam in Baghdad as well as symbolically indicated the end of Saddam's 24-year regime. A few months later, finally the military operation captured President Saddam Hussein in late December 2003 and eventually executed in 2006.\textsuperscript{32} While Baghdad had fallen to U.S.-led coalition forces, Bush gave a nationally televised victory speech from the carrier's flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003 and declared that major combat operations

\textsuperscript{30}George Melcher, \textit{Sovereignty Lost : America’s Path to Oblivion} (Indiana: Xlibris Corporation, 2009), p. 358
\textsuperscript{31}“Report concludes no WMD in Iraq” BBC, 7 October 2004 [on-line media]; available at \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3718150.stm}; accessed on September 16, 2014
in Iraq have ended.\textsuperscript{33} That kind of statement indicated the victory of U.S.-led coalition force invaded Iraq.

Furthermore, although the major combat operation had prevailed, the U.S. and its allies still kept their troops in Iraq for military assistant post-invasion phase. As Bush in the last statement of his speech added that,

\begin{quote}
The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done and then we will leave and we will leave behind a free Iraq.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Even though the operation was successfully capturing hundreds of Saddam’s henchman, overthrowing the Ba'ath Party government of Saddam Hussein, the war was still not end. On May 1, 2013 ending the invasion of stage and beginning the military occupation that Iraq was marked by a long and violent conflict between U.S.-led forces and Iraqi insurgents up until 2011. Then, three year before final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, in 2008 the U.S. established a security agreement with Iraq, which was known as Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

\textbf{B. U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 2008}

U.S.–Iraq Status of Force Agreement was an agreement in 2008 between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq. In every bilateral agreement addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while presenting in a foreign country, this agreement commonly referred to as

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 170
\end{footnotesize}
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA also establishes the right and privileges of foreign personnel present in a host country in support of the larger security arrangement.\textsuperscript{35}

U.S.–Iraq SOFA, was signed by the President George W. Bush administration and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in November 2008, that established the framework on the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq during their temporary presence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{36} It also included a specific date, on June 30 2009, by which American forces should withdraw from Iraqi cities, and a complete withdrawal date from Iraqi territory by the end of 2011.\textsuperscript{37}

Negotiations for a SOFA with Iraq were initiated to replace the UN mandate authorizing the U.S. and Coalition forces which responsible for contributing to the security of Iraq, which set to expire at the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, U.S. and Coalition forces have been in Iraq since 2003. And while the UN Security Council did not explicitly authorize the invasion, the council just approved the presence of foreign forces in an annually renewed resolution first adopted in October 2003.\textsuperscript{39} The U.S. and Coalition force operations are

\textsuperscript{37} Article 24 of the U.S.–Iraq Status of Force Agreement [on-line database]; available at \url{www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf}; accessed on July 7, 2014  
\textsuperscript{38} Security Council Report; available at \url{http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2008-12/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_4780501.php}; accessed on July, 12, 2014  
deployed in Iraq on basis of mandate from UN Security Council, adopting resolution 1511. The resolution officially recognizes the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)\(^{40}\) and authorizing a multinational forces to bring stability to the country, as well as sets forth the basis for international and UN collaboration for rebuilding Iraq and maintaining its security.\(^{41}\) Additionally, there are some clauses also often found in SOFA, including, in such as the authorization for military operations, the establishment of a withdrawal timeline, and the creation of committees to implement the agreement.\(^{42}\)

First, it addresses military operations by U.S. forces in cooperation with Iraqi forces. In Article 4 of Withdrawal Agreement, Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States in supporting Iraqi forces in efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq.\(^{43}\) Iraq specifically requests assistance with cooperation in the conduct of operation against al-Qaeda, other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.\(^{44}\)

Still in Article 4, all military operations conducted must be with the agreement of the Government of Iraq. The agreement called for the creation of a new Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) which will oversee the coordination of all military operations.\(^{45}\) There is an

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\(^{40}\) CPA was established as a transitional government after the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and their allied force. CPA vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA’s inception on 21 April 2003, until its dissolution on 28 June 2004. The aim is to oust the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003.  
\(^{41}\) UN Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), Iraq  
\(^{42}\) Ibid  
\(^{43}\) Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, Article 4.1 [hereinafter SOFA/Withdrawal Agreement]  
\(^{44}\) Ibid, Article 4.1  
\(^{45}\) Ibid, Article 4.2
additional requirement that all operations shall not infringe upon the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined by Iraq, and U.S. forces must respect the laws, customs, and traditions of Iraq.\textsuperscript{46}

Second, SOFA has established in the past not only set forth a specific activity or exercise, but also including a date or timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory. According to Withdrawal Agreement, the withdrawal is a two phase process. The first phase requires the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities, villages and localities no later than June 30, 2009; the second phase requires the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, during the period June 30, 2009, and December 31, 2011 the facilities and the area of military operation where U.S. forces will be stationed–are designated by JMOCC.\textsuperscript{48}

Third, SOFA’s clauses also contain the creation of committees to implement the agreement. In accordance with article 23 of Withdrawal Agreement, there are created three joint committees for implementation, \textit{inter alia}, Joint Ministerial Committee, JMOCC and Joint Committee.\textsuperscript{49}

A Joint Ministerial Committee is to be the first committee created and it requires participation at the ministerial level determined by both parties (U.S. and Iraq).\textsuperscript{50} The Joint Ministerial Committee is then responsible for creating the JMOCC – to coordinate military operations–consisting of representatives

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid}, Article 4.3
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid}, Article 24.1 and 24.2
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid}, Article 24.3
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid}, Article 24.3
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid}, Article 23.1
from both parties. The Joint Ministerial Committee is also responsible for creating a Joint Committee, with representatives from both parties, responsible for addressing all issues outside the exclusive competence of the JMOCC. The Joint Committee is then authorized to create Joint Sub-Committees as needed.

C. Barack Obama Withdrawal Plan

In early 2009, almost six years the U.S. presence in Iraq, Obama finally sets out his exit plan. Obama declared the beginning his plan for ending the Iraq War on February 27, 2009 in a speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The decision announced a month after Obama took office as the fulfillment of one of his election promises.

According to the Obama on his speech,

*Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end...As we carry out this drawdown, my highest priority will be the safety and security of our troops and civilians in Iraq.*

Still along similar lines with the Obama speech, from the 142,000 the U.S. troops existed in Iraq and 92,000 to 107,000 the U.S. troops were withdrew in August, 2010. Troop level in Iraq was cut by two-third. The rest was transitional forces between 35,000 to 50,000 troops still remained in Iraq.

51 *Ibid*, Article 23.2
52 *Ibid*, Article 23.3
53 *Ibid*, Article 23.4
55 *Ibid*. 

23

Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq at the end of August 2010, the name of the U.S. operation there—Operation Iraqi Freedom—was changed to Operation New Dawn. At the end of August 2010, the 4th Stryker Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division were among the last U.S. combat brigade to withdraw from Iraq.\footnote{“US troops leave Iraq,” \textit{BBC News}, 19 August 2010, [on-line media]; available at \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11022068}; accessed on July, 15 2014} Remaining about 50,000 U.S. troops operated under Operation New Dawn, from September 2010 until the end of 2011.\footnote{“US troops in Iraq below 50,000 ahead of August target,” \textit{BBC News}, 24 August 2010, [on-line media]; available at \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11069261}; accessed on July, 15 2014} This was a reflection of the reduced American role.

In October, 2011 Obama reaffirmed on his speech at a White House press conference about U.S. exit plan to full withdrawal of all remaining troops from Iraq by the end of December 2011.

\textit{So today I can report that, as promised, the rest of our troops in Iraq will come home by the end of the year. After nearly nine years, America's war in Iraq will be over.}\footnote{The White House, \textit{Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq}, [on-line database]; available at \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-iraq}; accessed on July, 15 2014}
Previously, in few months before Obama announcement on October, the U.S. has been discussing with Iraqi leaders the possibility of several thousand American troops remaining to continue training Iraqi security forces. During the discussions, Iraqi leaders have rejected to give U.S. troops immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts. Therefore, the U.S. government has refused to stay without it.\textsuperscript{61}

The consequence from that Obama speech was bringing the U.S. mission in Iraq to an end. But, the U.S. retained for some soldiers that attached to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and two U.S. Consulates, which is in Basra and Erbil. According to Denis McDonough, White House deputy national security adviser said the U.S. will have 4,000 to 5,000 security contractors to provide security for American diplomats.\textsuperscript{62}

Afterward, on December 14, 2011, Obama gave a speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina—Military Base home of the Airborne and Special Operations Forces—to salute in front of thousands of soldiers who recently returning from Iraq. President reiterated to mark the exit of the last U.S. troops from Iraq, asserting that nearly nine years of war was ending honorably. In his speech, Obama said that:

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
“We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people. We are building a new partnership between our nations.”

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63 Matt Compton, President Obama at Fort Bragg: Welcome Home [on-line database]; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/12/14/president-obama-fort-bragg-welcome-home; accessed on July, 15 2014
CHAPTER III

U.S. EXIT STRATEGY IN IRAQ

A. The Modes and Mechanisms of U.S. Exit Strategy in Iraq

In March 2003, the United States and its coalition partners began the Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war has lasted almost six years just since President Obama took office. Something important part of war to think is about how it ends. The only way to end the war is to set out exit planning from occupied territory. In the case of Iraq, the U.S. needs an Exit Strategy, not just an exit. At times the U.S. has used some modes and mechanisms to manage their exit.64

In order to elaborate this analysis, it is necessary to first elucidate the concept of Exit Strategy. The simple explanation of the concept is a plan to bring the troops home from some mission abroad. Furthermore, according to R. Caplan, Exit Strategy is “a transitional plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing from a state or territory, ideally having attained the goals.” It could be understood as a process of transition rather than the single event of mission closure.65

Most basically, the term of transition is referred to such as transferring responsibilities from military authorities to the U.S. embassy or the Iraqi government. At the same time, however, transition also referred to changes in the functions that the U.S. military engagement—from conducting combat

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65 Ibid, p. 7
operations to conducting counterinsurgency efforts, advising and assisting Iraqi Security Force, and ensuring as Iraq undergoes its own political transition and economic development efforts. During the process of transition, the U.S. have to consider what it can do to ensure a stable and secure Iraq after its troops are gone.

With regard to exit strategy, the states usually employ modes of transition and exit mechanisms to manage their exit from occupied territory. Still referring to R. Caplan, he mentions the modes and mechanisms of exit strategy that are: Cut and run; Phased withdrawal; Deadlines; Benchmarking; Election; and Successor operations.

These six modes and mechanism of exit, on the basis of the evidence currently available, it seems fair to suggest that the U.S. have employed three of them to manage their exit from Iraq.

First, cut and run. “Cut and run as modes and mechanisms of U.S. strategy to exit from Iraq where success is proving to be elusive and continued engagement costly. One option is to cut one's losses and withdraw from an operation entirely.”

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69 Richard Caplan, *op.cit.*, p. 9

70 Ibid.
Eleven years ago, the U.S. can be categorized as success story invaded and occupied Iraq by toppling down Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and Baghdad had fallen. President George W. Bush declared from the carrier's flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln to the country and to the world that in the battle of Iraq, the U.S. and allied forces have prevailed.

But when weighing those possible benefits against the costs of the U.S intervention, there was reflected costly. The costs include the human costs and the financial costs. A long period of war time, it was little gain for U.S. The war was merely to show the extent of U.S. power in the world.

Let's begin with the human cost, dealing with American and Iraqi casualties. Since the U.S. invaded Iraq, the data gathered in the iCasualties.org from 2003-2011 reported that the numbers for total U.S. military deaths toll are about 4,485 following Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) death toll rose to 10,125. In the separated source reported that at least 119,087 civilians were killed in the eight years since the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The next causality is the financial costs which are dealing with the expense of the war. The Department of Defense and Department of State has obligated for Iraq war (Fiscal Year 2003-11) and Afghan war (Fiscal Year

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71 iCasualties.org is a website that considered an authoritative record of Multi-National Force (MNF) casualties in Iraq and has been cited by, among others, the BBC, the Associated Press, Voice of America, The New York Times, and The Washington Pos.
2001-11) totally reached about $1.283 trillion for war funding operation. From the beginning of operations to July 31, 2011, is about $805.5 billion for the Iraq war. A closer look at the number appears of this total, 63% is for Iraq and the rest 35% for Afghanistan, and 2% for other miscellaneous expense.\(^75\) There is ample support for the claim that U.S. government expensed costly for Iraq—more than a half just for war funding operation.

Coincide with the economic strain, rising debt and fiscal constraint, President Obama said “it was time for America to focus on nation building here at home.”\(^76\) All these administration evaluation results reported that American presence in Iraq was actually hurting the U.S. interests and continuously increasing cost. Therefore the administration took an option to cut military spending by withdrawing from an operation entirely from Iraq in 2011.\(^77\) See chart III.A.1 below for demonstrating trends in U.S. military spending from year to year.


The second, the other modes and mechanisms of U.S. exit strategy from Iraq, was phased withdrawal or phased exit. Indeed there was various phased withdrawal that the states have been applied to manage their exit, usually depend on the situation and condition in occupied territory. One of them, such as U.S., is being transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of security in occupied territory—Iraq.\textsuperscript{78}

Focused on Obama administration, the final U.S. transition pace in Iraq was stipulated in 2008 Security Agreement (SA), as known as U.S.-Iraq SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), that specified an end to the USF-I (United States Forces-Iraq)\textsuperscript{79} presence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{80} The agreement took effect in 2009 when President Obama gave a speech in Marine Corps Base Camp

\textsuperscript{78} Richard Caplan, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 9
\textsuperscript{79} USF-I (United States Forces – Iraq) was an American military. It was stationed in Iraq as agreed with the Government of Iraq under the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). USF-I replaced the previous commands which is MNF-I (Multi-National Force – Iraq). MNF-I has operated from May 15, 2004, through December 31, 2009.
\textsuperscript{80} SOFA/Withdrawal Agreement, article 2.2
Lejeune, North Carolina on February 27, 2009 reaffirming the nation’s commitment to meeting the deadline articulated in the SA and transitioning the military out of Iraq.\textsuperscript{81}

President Obama outlined the transition that would be preceded in two stages.\textsuperscript{82} In the first phase, U.S. withdrawal plan by removing of two combat brigades--the Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division--from Iraq, with the target of ending the U.S. combat mission by August 31, 2010.\textsuperscript{83} The administration anticipated that this goal would require a drawdown between 92,000 and 107,000 are to leave by August, 2010.\textsuperscript{84} The exit routes of U.S. military convoy were passed through Kuwait and some other via Jordan.\textsuperscript{85}

In the second phase, the 50,000 troops who remained under the Operation New Dawn\textsuperscript{86} would have three discrete functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); conducting targeted counterterrorism missions in partnership with Iraqi counterparts; and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{86} In the past U.S. operational for its involvement in Iraq was called Operation Iraqi Freedom, from 2003-2010. But, on September 1, 2010 the name changed to Operation New Dawn. The new operational name was pursuant to Obama in his speech at the Oval Office in August, 2010 declared that the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. That means Operation Iraqi Freedom was also over.
\end{flushleft}
protecting ongoing civilian and military efforts. The USF-I, assigned to developing ISF capacity, would be organized into newly formed Advise-and-Assist Brigades (AABs). AABs are designed to partner with ISF to continue training and mentoring Iraqi forces. In detail, the role of the AABs is advising ISF locally and nationally, providing them a logistical safety, and assisting with governmental and private initiatives through mentorship and funding. Furthermore, under the security agreement AABs took a role as brigade with less on combat operations, more on advising, assisting and developing capabilities within the ISF. They also will conduct coordinated counterterrorism missions and protect ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq through the end of the mission. All U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011.

The third, the modes and mechanisms of U.S. exit strategy from Iraq, is about deadlines. Deadlines can be understood as the timetable for transition or exit that could be determined in advance and stipulated in a peace agreement. A predetermined timetable for the U.S. last exit from Iraq in 2011 has been laid out in U.S.-Iraq SOFA. This Security Agreement included a specific date

88 AAB mission comprised of the 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st, 2nd Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), and 3rd BCT; 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd BCT; the 10th Mountain Division’s 1st and 2nd BCTs, the 1st Armored Division’s 1st BCT.
for withdrawal of all forces from foreign territory. The withdrawal is a two phase process. According to SOFA article 2.1 and 2.2 explicitly stated that the first requires the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than June 30, 2009; and the second requires the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.\textsuperscript{91} In addition, This Security Agreement was signed by the President George W. Bush administration and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in November 2008 and took effect in 2009 that established the framework on the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq during their temporary presence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{92}

\textbf{B. The Transition Process in Iraq over U.S. Exit Strategy}

Exit Strategy is a transitional plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing from a state or territory, ideally having attained the goals. It could be understood as a process of transition rather than the single event of mission closure.\textsuperscript{93} In this section, the discussion will point to U.S. security transition from Iraq as well as economic support and governance reconstruction.

\textsuperscript{91} SOFA/Withdrawal Agreement, article 24.1 and 24.2
1. Security Transition

Before USF-I fully depart from Iraq, U.S. government formulated transition management and planning as part of U.S. exit strategy to manage their transition process that would enable follow on U.S. national interests, goals, and objectives, *inter alia* realizing an Iraq on stable and self-reliant that contributes to peace and security in the region beyond 2011. Managing transitions requires close cooperation between the U.S. and Iraqi government, militaries, and civil society.\(^{94}\)

Along similar lines, Lt Gen William B. Garrett—USF-I Chief of Staff—defined that the term transition as the transfer tasks and transformation programs that are managed by a military organization engaged in combat or any other military operation to the host nation\(^{95}\) that is U.S. Embassy follow on Department of Defense.\(^{96}\)

The framework of transition management and planning as part of U.S. exit strategy to manage their security transition process in Iraq, all that are set forth in two plan series, 2010 Joint Camp Plan (JCP) and Operation Order (OPORD) 11-01.

2010 JCP is such as kind of campaign plan, which was designed to reflect the SA and the SFA, provided for security assistance transition of U.S.

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94 “Senior Leader’s Guide to Transition Planning,” *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, 3 (May 2013), p. 1
95 In military term, host nation (HN) is nation that receives the forces and supplies of allied nations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. In this context the HN is Iraq.
military missions in Iraq to Iraqi government entities. It was released in the mid of the transition process which had been started in the beginning of 2009, precisely five months the after first phase troop withdrawal from Iraq. Signed on November, 23 2009 by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the USF-I Change of Command and went into effect in January 2010.

According to JCP base document, the JCP identified three campaign stages for describing the period of transition until the final withdrawal of all troops. In addition, from one stage to another stage of transitions would proceed with specified dates. Stage 1 is the transition to the new security environment. It would start from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. Stage 2, transition to a stronger bilateral relationship, would run from January 1, 2010 to the end of U.S. combat operations on December 31, 2011. In this second stage, as the last stage before the U.S. troop withdrawal, this phase more emphasize on training, enabling, and advising Iraqis to institute effective governance and conduct both internal and external security missions. Stage 3, Iraq as strategic partner. It would begin after the U.S. military mission in Iraq finished, at which point the U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship would begin to normalize. See figure III.1 for illustration and description of the elements of each stage of the campaign.

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100 Ibid.
The second plan series, as a complement to the 2010 JCP, is OPORD 11-01. This Operation Order was established in 2011 for the last 12 months of the mission by USF-I under the Operation New Dawn (OND).

The OPORD 11-01 directed USF-I to conduct stability operations support the U.S. mission in Iraq for achieving the campaign goals as identified in the JCP and as guidance on how USF-I would conduct transitions activities to set conditions for an enduring strategic partnership that

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In military term, an Operations Order, often abbreviated as OPORD, is an executable plan that directs a unit on how to conduct a military operation. An Operations Order will describe the situation facing the unit, the mission of the unit, and what activities the unit will conduct to achieve the mission goals.
contributes to regional stability beyond 2011.\textsuperscript{102} Then this Operation Order also ensures for USF-I to accomplish all essential tasks by December 31, 2011.

To achieve this mission, OPORD 11-01 established ten key tasks as follows:

1. Protect the forces.
3. Advice, train, assists, and equips the ISF.
4. Conduct partnered counterterrorism operations and an enduring counterterrorism capability within Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF).
5. Provide military capabilities in support of Embassy Baghdad.
6. Transfer responsibility to appropriate partners.
9. Support reconciliation efforts within Iraq to address grievances between Arabs and Kurds, and between the Sunni/SOI and the Shia extremist groups.
10. Remove the forces.\textsuperscript{103}

Furthermore, to actualize the ten key tasks above, as illustrated in figure III.2 below, OPORD 11-01 also set forth three lines of effort (LOEs) and 13 supporting objectives for this mission, those are:

1. Continue to develop and strengthen ISF capacity to conduct internal and external defense missions.
2. Conduct transitions by handing over key functions to the embassy and other entities, establishing an embassy OSC-I (Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq)\textsuperscript{104}, and ensuring that the U.S. embassy could accomplish its core missions.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 83
\textsuperscript{104} OSC-I is the foundation of U.S. long-term security relationship with Iraq and represents a component of the normalization of U.S.-Iraq relations. That operates under U.S. Embassy in Iraq. One of the missions of OSC-I conduct equipping and training between ISF and U.S. militaries, even post U.S withdrawal. OSC-I also work for the ambassador and facilitates foreign military sales, as well as provide the international military education and training opportunities.
3. Reposture\textsuperscript{105} the force, which would involve returning facilities to the Iraqi government, disposing of equipment, and removing 50,000 troops.\textsuperscript{106}

![Figure III.2. OPORD 11-01 Lines of Effort](source)


\section*{2. In Transition: Economic Support and Governance Reconstruction}

In the process of transition exit from Iraq, the U.S. not only prepared security transition planning, but also reconstructed and supported Iraq’s economy and governance. Through economically support which is expected that the road to sustainable development in the near future beyond 2011 after no more U.S. engagement in Iraq. Through governance reconstruction is to

\textsuperscript{105} Reposture is a military phrase that referring to moving the troops to other locations outside the country.

\textsuperscript{106} Richard R. Brennan, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 83
achieve ethical, competent and effective governance. This transition is also prepared to Iraq away from dependence on U.S.

For the sake of succession of U.S. exit strategy, since 2009 to 2011—the period of U.S. transition process—the total of U.S. has appropriated $11.229 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including the building of physical infrastructure, establishment of political and societal institutions, reconstitution of security forces, and economic support.¹⁰⁷

As of April 15, 2011 the data generated by SIGIR¹⁰⁸ in table III.B.1 reported that $6.273 billion for FY 2009 - FY2011 had been made available through four major funds:

1. Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)—$3.5 billion to support the infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment needs of the ISF.
2. Economic Support Fund (ESF)—$1.25 billion to support projects in improving infrastructure and community security, promoting democracy and civil society, and supporting capacity building and economic over Iraq which is administered by the U.S. Department of State.
3. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)—$685 million to be used by U.S. military commanders to address the urgent relief and reconstruction needs in their areas of responsibility.
4. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)—$837 million to support a full year of operations of the Police Development Program (PDP) in Iraq.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ SIGIR (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) was an independent government agency created by the Congress to provide oversight of the use or misuse of the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq.
Table III.B.1. U.S. Appropriated Funds (in $ Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Funds</th>
<th>Appropriations by Fiscal Year FY 2009–FY 2011</th>
<th>Total Appropriated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)</td>
<td>FY 2009: $1,000, FY 2010: $1,000, FY 2011: $1,500</td>
<td>$3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total Major Funds</strong></td>
<td>FY 2009: $1,917, FY 2010: $2,348, FY 2011: $2,008</td>
<td>$6,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Assistance Programs</td>
<td>FY 2009: $438, FY 2010: $411, FY 2011: $336</td>
<td>$1,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total Other Assistance Programs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$11,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, other than just funding to Iraq’s infrastructure, the U.S. has also attempted to transfer responsibility to Iraqi government providing assistance on the physical protection of important infrastructure, such as electricity and oil facilities. Efforts to secure infrastructure include the use of biometrics, construction of security perimeters, lighting and communications improvements, establishment of exclusion zones for pipelines, and involving the Iraqi army to protect infrastructure.\(^{110}\)

For the sake of Iraq’s on sovereign, stable, and self-reliant, the U.S. government had the strategy to realize the development of effective and legitimate governance institution beyond 2011. The U.S. initiated

Government Capacity Development Programs for Iraq. In 2011, the U.S. had expended $5.14 billion in support of these programs, mainly using the Economic Support Fund (ESF) budget.\textsuperscript{111} The program including:

1. National capacity development (\textit{tatweer})—$299.34 million to train more than 100,000 government employees in modern administrative systems and management practices in 18 provinces, including budget execution and service delivery.
2. Local governance program—$409.54 million to help to build management and knowledge skills of provincial government personnel, support grassroots civil society programs, and promote women's involvement in government.
3. Ministerial capacity development—$35.53 million to increase the ability of several of Iraq's ministries.
4. Democracy and civil society program—$183.5 million to build capacity within democratic institutions at the national, provincial, and community levels, as well as to provide extensive training within the National Election Commission and to uphold rule of law projects.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid}
CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. EXIT STRATEGY FROM IRAQ

This chapter is concerned with the issue of how effective U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq. The effectiveness of U.S. exit strategy is still questionable given current situation in Iraq. Therefore, a research is required to prove whether is effective or not.

The main conceptual premise of exit strategy is “a transitional plan for the disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties from a state or territory.” Ideally, the external parties, who conduct invasion, have achieved their principal on post-conflict state-building before final withdrawal phase. The achievement of principal on post-conflict state-building is having relation with a successful of exit strategy that is leaves behind a consolidated peace.113

Furthermore, if referring to United Nations’ definition, a consolidated peace is a self-sustaining peace. It could be characterized not only the absence of military conflict in a state, but also the absence of some threats to public security, such as political repression and discrimination toward minority, ethnic, sect, religion group, widespread of violence, and so on.114

As R. Caplan mention on his book, the specific criteria for measuring an effectiveness and successful exit strategy is existence of consolidated peace that meets with three interconnected sets: “(1) the establishment and

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maintenance of basic security; (2) the development of effective and legitimate
governance institutions and the rule of law; and (3) the creation of conditions
for economic and social well-being.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{A. Domestic Security Condition}

Since the final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in December 2011, Iraq is experiencing a crisis – a resurgence of Islamist violence, sectarian tension, and growing public insecurity. The impact has become a growing threat to public safety, especially for the Iraqi people. Violence, essentially, is the most visible indication whether or not the U.S. exit strategy is effective.

The failure of U.S. Forces in the country during transition phase 2009-2011 to train and to support Iraqi counterterrorism operations has caused to the Iraqi Security Forces and police units remain overstretched to patrol the country’s skies as well as to confront domestic insurgency, such as the reemergence of Al Qaeda in Iraq and some other threats. The result is an Iraq that is less stable domestically.\textsuperscript{116}

Prolonged fighting between Sunni opposition groups and Shia-led security forces drove the death toll in Iraq upward. The following table IV.A.1 generated by Iraqi Body Count (IBC)\textsuperscript{117} attempt to count Iraq’s level of violence monthly from 2008 through 2013. Those focus on the trends since

\textsuperscript{115} Caplan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 288.
\textsuperscript{117} Iraq Body Count (IBC) is a web-based project that attempts to record civilian deaths resulting from the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq.
2008—a year before the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement took effect—and 2011
in which the year of final withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from Iraq.

Table IV.A.1. Monthly Civilian Deaths from Violence, 2008-2013, by IBC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total by Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
<td>372</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>389</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012</strong></td>
<td>529</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td>357</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>1095</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over the course of 2013, Iraq experienced its worst levels of violence
since 2006 and 2007, when the country fell down into all-out civil war.
According to the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)\(^\text{118}\), see chart
IV.A.1 shows the total number of civilian casualties (including police) deaths
in 2013 was the highest since 2008, with 7,818 killed and 17,981 injured in
2013, compared to 2008 when 6,787 Iraqis were killed and 20,178. As noted
earlier, IBC also noted in 2013 was the deadliest causalities year in Iraq with
9,656 killed since the last U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011.

\(^{118}\) The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is an entity that was formed by
A closer look at the table 4.A.1 indicates that September was the most violent month in 2013, with a total of 1,306 civilian casualties was killed. The total number of civilian casualties was consistently above 900 after July 2013, and a total of 9,656 Iraqis were killed in acts of terrorism in 2013.

Again, from January through December of 2013, approximately 9,656 civilians were killed in fighting. A major confrontation between Shia and Sunni that began in December 2012 that led to major fighting in Anbar, Sunni-dominated province west of Baghdad. Iraqi’s minority Sunni kept up protest on a Shia-led government as majority that many accuse of trying to
marginalize them. Anbar was reported once the deadly Sunni insurgency that erupted after the US-led invasion in 2003.  

Additionally, chart IV.A.2 and chart IV.A.3’s findings lend support to the claim that the statistical trend in violence shows a clear upward trend from 2011 till to 2013. There has been rising sectarian violence over two years, much of it terrorism by Sunni extremists who have targeted the government and Shia civilians.

Chart IV.A.2. Violence Indicator, 2008 – 2013 (Documented Civilian Death from Violence per year before and after U.S. Engagement in Iraq)


Mapping Iraq’s conflict, the most violence was concentrated in and around Baghdad, Ninawa and Kirkuk. Violent incidents also occurred in Anbar, Diyala, Ar-Rutba, Tal Afar, Mosul, Irbil, Samarra, Tirkit, Fallujah, Al Kut, and Najaf, while in the southern Iraq around Basra saw very few incidents.\footnote{Report on Human Rights in Iraq: 2011, UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, (May 2012), p. vi} As well, Sunni tensions with the central government were rising in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and Arab-Kurdish tension continued a serious threat in Mosul and Kirkuk.\footnote{Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, “Iraq After US Withdrawal: U.S. Policy and the Iraqi Search for Security and Stability,” Center for Strategic and International Studies/CSIS, (July, 2012), p. 6} Moreover, see figure IV.1 for mapping the deadliest casualties across the city in Iraq since 2013.
As UNAMI documented, the mostly pattern of violent incidents used by insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq is Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)—also known as car bombings.122

Based on all the evidence available above, there is growing support for the claim that levels of violence in Iraq is remain high after the U.S. exit from Iraq in 2011. Ideally an effective of exit strategy, according to Richard Caplan, is one that leaves behind a self-sustaining peace in occupied state post

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withdrawal of external parties.\textsuperscript{123} In Iraq from year to year, the number of civilians killed in conflict related to incidents has significantly increased from 2011-2013. In the context of an effectiveness of U.S. exit strategy, U.S. failed to establish and to inherit sustainable peace in Iraq beyond 2011.

Indeed, U.S. Department of State has spent $343 million worth of construction as well as for the Iraqi Security Forces and police training program for five years. Whereas, occupation and reconstruction, according to James F. Jeffrey, the American ambassador to Iraq, has not gone as planned.\textsuperscript{124}

Along similar lines, the U.S. Commander in Iraq at that time, General Lloyd Austin, now the commander of all U.S. troops in the Middle East and South Asia, predicted that:

As we leave, we can expect to see some turbulence in security initially….The threat from the Sunni extremist organization al-Qaeda in Iraq could grow as militant groups to fill the vacuum that the departing Americans leave behind. Al Qaeda will continue to do what it’s done in the past, and we expect that it’s possible they could even increase their capability. If the Iraqi security forces and the government of Iraq are able to counter that, it will be a good thing. If they can’t, they’ll continue to grow in capacity.\textsuperscript{125}

Last but not least, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said:

Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered it, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they’re leaving now before the tree bears fruit.\textsuperscript{126}

B. Political Stability

As former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq said:

America left Iraq with almost no infrastructure. The political process is going in a very wrong direction, going toward a dictatorship...People are not going to accept that, and most likely they are going to ask for the division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster. Dividing the country isn't going to be smooth, because dividing the country is going to be a war.127

Post U.S. forces withdrawal, Iraq continues to experience high levels of violence which is becoming a major challenge to Iraq’s political stability as well as threatening the function of democracy. That is because of political and sectarian factions have fought for power struggle.

In order to analyze this, it is necessary to first elucidate the current political condition in Iraq. Actually, Iraq’s current violence is not only a single caused by extremist movements, or sectarian and ethnic divisions, but also Iraq’s political failure who is currently led by the Nouri al Maliki.128 Iraq’s Shia is now the dominant force in Iraq’s government and security services.129 Then, Iraq falls into failed governance. The consequence of failed leadership is increasing the sectarian divisions between Shia and Sunni, and also raising the ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd.130

The 2010 election triggered a broad crisis in Iraqi political stability rather than build up a stable democracy. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki seeks to preserve his power and becomes a more authoritarian leader.

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127 Toby Dodge, “The political process is going in a very wrong direction Survival,” *Survival*, 54 (June–July 2012) p. 149
128 Nouri Al-Maliki is current Iraq's prime minister and the leader of the Shia Islamic Al Dawa Party. He first came to power in 2006.
130 Ibid, p. x
Eventually, lead to clash between Sunni and Shia, and Arab and Kurd that as groups struggled to assert their own interests.\textsuperscript{131}

A result of the 2010 election, seats in parliament by majority party, first an opposition party that mixed Shia and Sunnis that called the Iraqi National Movement (INM)—led by Ayad Allawi—had 24.72% of the total and won 91 seats. Second, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition got 24.22% and won 89 seats. A third largely Shia party which included the Sadr faction—the National Iraqi Alliance led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari—got 18.2% of the total, and won 58 seats.\textsuperscript{132}

Since that time, as Shia as majority seat in parliament, Maliki’s tend to become authoritarian regime and try to consolidate his own power rather than share it. There is ample for claiming that:

1. Now, political and military power in Iraq is highly centralized in Prime Minister Maliki’s personal office. The result of 2010 parliamentary elections was Shia party as majoritarian government in which Maliki has chance a monopoly on the institutions of the state. This will have implications for the future of Iraq and its democratic transition.

2. Maliki is the dominant forces over Iraq’s conventional military forces, gained control over the 4,200-strong special operations forces, intelligence apparatus, and civilian ministries. Maliki began his security consolidation not long after taking office.

3. After the 2010 election, Maliki expanded his control over many of Iraq’s civilian institutions, including the judiciary and independent bodies such as the elections commission, central bank, and the anti-corruption watchdog.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid
4. Through his consolidation of power, Maliki has subverted the system of checks and balances that was intended in the Iraqi constitution. His growing influence over and limitations on independent institutions have tarnished the legitimacy and efficacy of these bodies, particularly the judiciary and the parliament.\textsuperscript{133}

Again, through his consolidation of power Prime Minister Maliki uses more repressive efforts to his political opponents, such as abuse of human rights and misuse of the Iraqi security forces that has repressed and marginalized large segments of the Iraqi population.\textsuperscript{134}

In line with Ayad Allawi\textsuperscript{135}, he asserted that Maliki still controls the country’s security ministries and all decisions go through him. And also the hundreds of people were detained by the government on for backing terrorism and supporting the banned Baath Party. Sunni minority of Iraqi always expressing its refusal to the policy seems like that exclusion and marginalization, lack of power sharing, politicization of the judiciary, the lack of balance within the government institutions.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{133} Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Institute for the Study of War/ISW, (April 2013), p. 6
\textsuperscript{134} Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, op.cit., p. 97
\textsuperscript{135} Ayad Alawi was elected by the Governing Council to be the Interim Prime Minister of Iraq to govern the country beginning with the United States’ handover of sovereignty (June 30, 2004) until national elections, scheduled for early 2005.
The chart IV.A.4 indicates that rates regimes on a scale of 1 to 7, Iraq gets number six on both political rights and civil liberties. And also focus on 2010-2013, Iraq’s political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 in 2013 because of the centralization of power by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and increasing pressure on the political opposition.

There is growing to support that Iraq is not an electoral democracy yet. Freedom House noted that although Iraq has held elections post U.S. invasion in 2005 and 2010, political participation and decision-making in the country remain seriously interrupted by sectarian and insurgent violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of foreign powers.

Rates regimes on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being free as possible and 7 unfree as possible. For example, liberal democracies like the U.S., U.K., France, and Costa Rica get perfect 1 on both (political rights and civil liberties).

Freedom House is a U.S.-based non-governmental organization (NGO) that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights.

Iraq, Freedom House, [on-line database]; available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/iraq#.VApZm6O6qQh; accessed on September, 6 2014
Based on all the evidence available above, Iraq is growing a political crisis as U.S. pulls out from the country. Ideally an effective of exit strategy, according to Richard Caplan, is one that leaves behind a consolidated/self-sustaining peace in occupied state post withdrawal of external parties. The specific criteria for measuring an effective exit strategy is existence of consolidated peace that meets with three interconnected sets. One of them is the development and legitimate governance institutions. In this case, there is no compelling reason to argue that the U.S. exit strategy is not quite effective, the U.S. failed to leave behind a legacy of stability and leave weak political foundation for Iraqi government. This situation may a threat to undermine the function of democracy, and it is not reflects to the 3rd stage of USF’s Campaign Stages of 2010 Joint Camp Plan which is achieve and sustain an ethical, competent and participatory governance.

Last but not least, if at all possible the U.S. might be responsible for situation in Iraq. As stipulated in Section II, point 2 of 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement the U.S. committed to enhancing bilateral relations across all areas covered by the, including efforts to “support and strengthen Iraq’s democracy and its democratic institutions as defined and established in the Iraqi Constitution.”

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140 Richard Caplan, op.cit., p. 288
141 Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, Section II.
C. National Economic and Social Well-Being

Iraq is experiencing a domestic crisis since the U.S. forces final exit from Iraq in the end of 2011. As previous discussion, from year to year the levels of violence in Iraq is remaining high then followed by sectarian factions have fought for political power struggle. Both security and political crisis have a parallel impact to the Iraq recent economic development.

International Monetary Fund reported that the security and political situation has gotten worse in Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011. The government performance has been interrupted by political power struggle and increasing sectarian conflict. For instance, the tensions between the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government also remain high because of disagreements in sharing of oil export revenues. Inevitable, the security crisis from year to year has parallel impact to the economic development as well as UNAMI recorded about 9,656 deaths in 2013 which is the deadliest causalities last five years.\textsuperscript{142}

Although Iraq domestic situation is under crisis, macroeconomic developments have been increase positively last three years. Economic growth has accelerated from 5.9 percent in 2010 to over 8.4 percent in 2012, when oil production averaged 3 million barrels per day (mbpd), the highest level achieved in the last 30 years. In 2013, growth to rise to 9 percent as oil production increases to about 3.3 mbpd. Indeed, Iraq’s economic growth

\textsuperscript{142} “Iraq Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation,” \textit{International Monetary Fund/IMF}, (April 2013), p. 7
prospects are positive because of rising oil prices and Iraq’s largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 90% of government revenue. Preferably, a stable macro economy is sufficient to ensure continued prosperity.\textsuperscript{143}

However, Iraq failed to translate oil wealth into economic growth and adequate per capita income. Based on GDP PPP (purchasing power parity) per capita, IMF reported that Iraq’s per capita income only at $ 7,079.1 in 2013. Low compared to other oil biggest reserve countries and OPEC member countries such as Saudi Arabia is $ 32,469.3, Venezuela is $ 13,633.6, Iran is $13,008.4, United Arab Emirates is $ 49,883.58, and Kuwait is $ 39,861.23.\textsuperscript{144} Because GDP usually become a method to measure the wealth of countries and the average welfare or poverty of residents of a country, Iraq ideally, as one of world’s oil biggest reserve country, able to boost up more the number of its GDP per capita likes the other countries that have big of oil reserve.

Again, Iraq failed to translate growth in oil receipts into prosperity for the people of Iraq. According to BTI\textsuperscript{145} “the level of Iraq’s socioeconomic development is still characterized by an intense degree of deprivation.”\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{144} Valentina Pasquali, the Poorest Countries in the World [database on-line]; available at https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world; accessed on September 18, 2014
\textsuperscript{145} BTI stands for The Bertelsmann Transformation Index. It is the private operating non-profit foundation in Germany that aims to measure the effectiveness of the transformation to democracy and an equitable market economy of non-liberal countries.
UNDP reported that despite Iraq is wealth in oil reserve and GDP growth rate has been positive for 2013, Iraq is still unable to create enough jobs for its people and leads to unemployment levels of at least 20%, meanwhile the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013, reported that 21.4% of Iraqis still live on less than $2 a day.\textsuperscript{147} So, high poverty rates are generally related to high unemployment rate.

In addition, Iraq as the world’s third largest reserves of crude oil might be able to increase their production like other oil biggest reserve country. In the chart IV.A.5 shows that Iraq is just the twelfth rank in the term of oil production over the world. Having the vast oil reserves in Iraq are not in question, but the country facing many challenges amid political uncertainty and security crisis inhibits oil production. Internal disputes between the central government and Iraq’s oil rich regions, as well as poor infrastructure, political uncertainty, sabotage, and attacks on oil pipelines damage infrastructure, limit Iraq’s ability to produce and export oil.\textsuperscript{148} Chart IV.A.6 showed that in 2013 Iraq’s oil export revenue sharply decreases. In that year the terrorist group attacked Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Kirkuk-Ceyhan is the 970-kilometre the oil pipeline that connected between northern Iraq and Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. It is able to pump 300,000 barrels of crude oil


\textsuperscript{148} Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, “Iraq in Crisis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies/CSIS; (May, 2014), p. 335
per day. So, chart IV.A.6 asserted that there is a correlation between the Iraq’s oil export revenue and security condition in Iraq.

Chart IV.A.5. Comparison between Iraq’s Oil Reserves and Oil Production

[Graph showing oil reserves and production by top 15 companies]

Source: RFA

Chart IV.A.6. Comparison of Oil Revenue from Export, 2008-2013

[Graph showing oil revenue from export by years]

Source: Brookings
http://www.brookings.edu/~media/centers/saban/iraq%20index/index20130726.pdf

Based on all the evidence available above, Iraq is experiencing the uncertain impact of economic growth. The U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq is a symptom of a cause of Iraq security crisis nowadays. Even, the last three years Iraq’s nominal GDP is rising, stable macro economy is not sufficient to ensure continued prosperity. Iraq failed to translate oil wealth into economic growth and adequate per capita income. Ideally an effective of exit strategy, according to Richard Caplan, is one that leaves behind a consolidated/self-sustaining peace in occupied state post withdrawal of external parties. The specific criteria for measuring an effective exit strategy is existence of consolidated peace that meets with three interconnected sets. One of them is creation of conditions for economic and social well-being.\(^{150}\)

\(^{150}\) Richard Caplan, *op.cit.*, p. 287
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Before ultimately withdrawing the U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. has run modes and mechanisms to manage its transition process. With the expectation what the U.S. did to ensure a stable and self-reliant Iraq. However, since the absence of the U.S. presence in Iraq after its final troop withdrawal from the country by the end 2011, Iraq is experiencing a serious crisis, including security, politic, and economy. The U.S. exit strategy is failed to leave behind a legacy of stability and to inherit consolidate peace in Iraq beyond 2011.

Violence, essentially, is the most visible indication whether there is effective or not the U.S. exit strategy. Iraq has been facing a security crisis as it has been posed by the reemergence of violent Sunni extremist movements. This research found that the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011, the statistical trend in violence showed a clear upward trend until late 2013. Sectarian violence became more frequent and more intense in the last two years, many of Sunni extremist group have been terrorizing the government and Shia civilians. Especially in 2013 Iraq experienced its worst levels of violence followed by the deadliest casualties.

Again, prolong fighting between Iraq’s minorities Sunni as the opposition group and Shia-led security forces have driven the death toll in
Iraq upward. Even though U.S. Forces had trained and supported Iraqi counterterrorism operations during transition phase by 2009-2011, Iraqi Security Forces and police units remain overstretched to confront domestic insurgency, such as the reemergence of Al Qaeda in Iraq and some other threats, resulting in a domestically less stable Iraq. Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, and Tameem provinces were the most frequently attacked cities.

The recent security situation in Iraq could not be separated from its domestic political affairs. The higher the level of political friction occurred, the more the sectarian violence across the country. Iraq continued to experience high levels of violence which was becoming a major challenge toward Iraq’s political stability as well as the function of democracy. That is because the political and sectarian factions have fought for power.

Even though Iraq successfully has carried out its third national elections since regime change which was won by Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister Maliki tends to be authoritarian. Maliki coalition was the biggest winner in Iraqi elections, as Shia as majority seat in parliament. With his authoritarian, Maliki tends to centralize his political power, consolidate his power rather than share it, politicize the judiciary and the armed forces in pursuit of his own political ends, and marginalize his opponents. This situation leads to clash between Sunni and Shia, meanwhile Arab and Kurd as groups struggle to assert their respective interests.
There is growing to support that Iraq is still not fully democracy yet. All there have been mentions above hurting the function and the essential of democracy. Everyone acknowledge that Americans brought democracy to Iraq. But practically the leader tend to monopolize political power, little respect for rule of law, and undermine the process of democracy, such as to focus on preserving his power and steadily becoming a more authoritarian leader.

Moreover, amid Iraq’s political turmoil and security crisis, both of them have a parallel impact to the Iraq recent economic development. Last three years from 2011 to 2013 Iraq’s real GDP growth to rise. However, in this case Iraq’s macroeconomic growth may not be sufficient to ensure continued prosperity, due to the 95 % of the government's revenues has been dominated by the oil sector and Iraq failed to translate oil wealth into prosperity of the Iraqi people.

Based on available fact that Iraq remains high in GDP nominal, but poverty rates remain high--if compared to the other oil biggest reserve country--in Iraq one quarter of the population live under poverty line while some others of Iraqis live in extreme poverty. Ideally Iraq as one of the oil biggest reserve country in the world may capable to ensure equal distribution of wealth for its people prosperity.

Considering all three points (security, politic, and economy) above, this research found that U.S. exit strategy cannot meet the three interconnected sets of requirement for the effective of exit strategy. Firstly, the establishment
and maintenance of basic security. Secondly, the development of effective and legitimate governance of institutions. Thirdly, the creation of conditions for economic and social well-being.

Consequently, Iraq is still experiencing crisis, either security, politic, or economic aspects after the U.S. exit from Iraq. The U.S. failed to leave behind the legacy of stability and to inherit consolidate peace in Iraq beyond 2011. A consolidated peace is a self-sustaining peace. Iraq would have been self-sustaining had U.S. left the country in peace, stable and self-reliant. On these grounds, this thesis can be concluded that the U.S. exit strategy for leaving Iraq is not effective.
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Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq
On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the
Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq
Preamble
The United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, referred to hereafter as “the Parties”:
Recognizing the importance of strengthening their joint security, contributing to world peace and stability, combating terrorism in Iraq, and cooperating in the security and defense spheres, thereby deterring aggression and threats against the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iraq and against its democratic, federal, and constitutional system;
Affirming that such cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each of them in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;
Out of a desire to reach a common understanding that strengthens cooperation between them;
Without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its territory, waters, and airspace; and
Pursuant to joint undertakings as two sovereign, independent, and coequal countries;
Have agreed to the following:

Article 1
Scope and Purpose
This Agreement shall determine the principal provisions and requirements that regulate the temporary presence, activities, and withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq.
Article 2
Definition of Terms

1. "Agreed facilities and areas" are those Iraqi facilities and areas owned by the Government of Iraq that are in use by the United States Forces during the period in which this Agreement is in force.

2. "United States Forces" means the entity comprising the members of the United States Armed Forces, their associated civilian component, and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of Iraq.

3. "Member of the United States Forces" means any individual who is a member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.

4. "Member of the civilian component" means any civilian employed by the United States Department of Defense. This term does not include individuals normally resident in Iraq.

5. "United States contractors" and "United States contractor employees" mean non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States Forces. However, the terms do not include persons or legal entities normally resident in the territory of Iraq.

6. "Official vehicles" means commercial vehicles that may be modified for security purposes and are basically designed for movement on various roads and designated for transportation of personnel.

7. "Military vehicles" means all types of vehicles used by the United States Forces, which were originally designated for use in combat operations and display special distinguishing numbers and symbols according to applicable United States Forces instructions and regulations.

8. "Defense equipment" means systems, weapons, supplies, equipment, munitions, and materials exclusively used in conventional warfare that are
required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement and are not related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons).

9. "Storage" means the keeping of defense equipment required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement.

10. "Taxes and duties" means all taxes, duties (including customs duties), fees, of whatever kind, imposed by the Government of Iraq, or its agencies, or governorates under Iraqi laws and regulations. However, the term does not include charges by the Government of Iraq, its agencies, or governorates for services requested and received by the United States Forces.

**Article 3**

**Laws**

1. While conducting military operations pursuant to this Agreement, it is the duty of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions and to refrain from any activities that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this Agreement. It is the duty of the United States to take all necessary measures for this purpose.

2. With the exception of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, the United States Forces may not transfer any person into or out of Iraq on vehicles, vessels, or aircraft covered by this Agreement, unless in accordance with applicable Iraqi laws and regulations, including implementing arrangements as may be agreed to by the Government of Iraq.

**Article 4**

**Missions**

1. The Government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain
security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.

2. All such military operations that are carried out pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq. Such operations shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities. The coordination of all such military operations shall be overseen by a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) to be established pursuant to this Agreement. Issues regarding proposed military operations that cannot be resolved by the JMOCC shall be forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee.

3. All such operations shall be conducted with full respect for the Iraqi Constitution and the laws of Iraq. Execution of such operations shall not infringe upon the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined by the Government of Iraq. It is the duty of the United States Forces to respect the laws, customs, and traditions of Iraq and applicable international law.

4. The Parties shall continue their efforts to cooperate to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying, and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing, and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces.

5. The Parties retain the right to legitimate self-defense within Iraq, as defined in applicable international law.

Article 5
Property Ownership

1. Iraq owns all buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil that exist on agreed facilities and areas, including those that are used, constructed, altered, or improved by the United States Forces.

2. Upon their withdrawal, the United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq all the facilities and areas provided for the use of the combat forces of the United States, based on two lists. The first list of agreed facilities and areas shall take effect upon the entry into force of the
Agreement. The second list shall take effect no later than June 30, 2009, the date for the withdrawal of combat forces from the cities, villages, and localities. The Government of Iraq may agree to allow the United States Forces the use of some necessary facilities for the purposes of this Agreement on withdrawal.

3. The United States shall bear all costs for construction, alterations, or improvements in the agreed facilities and areas provided for its exclusive use. The United States Forces shall consult with the Government of Iraq regarding such construction, alterations, and improvements, and must seek approval of the Government of Iraq for major construction and alteration projects. In the event that the use of agreed facilities and areas is shared, the two Parties shall bear the costs of construction, alterations, or improvements proportionately.

4. The United States shall be responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in the agreed facilities and areas exclusively used by it, and both Parties shall be proportionally responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in joint agreed facilities and areas.

5. Upon the discovery of any historical or cultural site or finding any strategic resource in agreed facilities and areas, all works of construction, upgrading, or modification shall cease immediately and the Iraqi representatives at the Joint Committee shall be notified to determine appropriate steps in that regard.

6. The United States shall return agreed facilities and areas and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established during the term of this Agreement, according to mechanisms and priorities set forth by the Joint Committee. Such facilities and areas shall be handed over to the Government of Iraq free of any debts and financial burdens.

7. The United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq the agreed facilities and areas that have heritage, moral, and political significance and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established, according to mechanisms, priorities, and a time period as mutually agreed by the Joint Committee, free of any debts or financial burdens.
8. The United States Forces shall return the agreed facilities and areas to the Government of Iraq upon the expiration or termination of this Agreement, or earlier as mutually agreed by the Parties, or when such facilities are no longer required as determined by the JMOCC, free of any debts or financial burdens.

9. The United States Forces and United States contractors shall retain title to all equipment, materials, supplies, relocatable structures, and other movable property that was legitimately imported into or legitimately acquired within the territory of Iraq in connection with this Agreement.

Article 6
Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas

1. With full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, and as part of exchanging views between the Parties pursuant to this Agreement, Iraq grants access and use of agreed facilities and areas to the United States Forces, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and other individuals or entities as agreed upon by the Parties.

2. In accordance with this Agreement, Iraq authorizes the United States Forces to exercise within the agreed facilities and areas all rights and powers that may be necessary to establish, use, maintain, and secure such agreed facilities and areas. The Parties shall coordinate and cooperate regarding exercising these rights and powers in the agreed facilities and areas of joint use.

3. The United States Forces shall assume control of entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for its exclusive use. The Parties shall coordinate the control of entry into agreed facilities and areas for joint use and in accordance with mechanisms set forth by the JMOCC. The Parties shall coordinate guard duties in areas adjacent to agreed facilities and areas through the JMOCC.
Article 7
Positioning and Storage of Defense Equipment

The United States Forces may place within agreed facilities and areas and in other temporary locations agreed upon by the Parties defense equipment, supplies, and materials that are required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement. The use and storage of such equipment shall be proportionate to the temporary missions of the United States Forces in Iraq pursuant to Article 4 of this Agreement and shall not be related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons). The United States Forces shall control the use and relocation of defense equipment that they own and are stored in Iraq. The United States Forces shall ensure that no storage depots for explosives or munitions are near residential areas, and they shall remove such materials stored therein. The United States shall provide the Government of Iraq with essential information on the numbers and types of such stocks.

Article 8
Protecting the Environment

Both Parties shall implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with protecting the natural environment and human health and safety. The United States reaffirms its commitment to respecting applicable Iraqi environmental laws, regulations, and standards in the course of executing its policies for the purposes of implementing this Agreement.

Article 9
Movement of Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft

1. With full respect for the relevant rules of land and maritime safety and movement, vessels and vehicles operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces may enter, exit, and move within the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. The JMOCC shall develop appropriate procedures and rules to facilitate and regulate the movement of vehicles.
2. With full respect for relevant rules of safety in aviation and air navigation, United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense are authorized to over-fly, conduct airborne refueling exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement over, and land and take off within, the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. The Iraqi authorities shall grant the aforementioned aircraft permission every year to land in and take off from Iraqi territory exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense, vessels, and vehicles shall not have any party boarding them without the consent of the authorities of the United States Forces. The Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter shall take appropriate action to facilitate the regulation of such traffic.

3. Surveillance and control over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement.

4. Iraq may request from the United States Forces temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.

5. United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under contract to the United States Department of Defense shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including overflight or navigation fees, landing, and parking fees at government airfields. Vehicles and vessels owned or operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including for vessels at government ports. Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall be free from registration requirements within Iraq.

6. The United States Forces shall pay fees for services requested and received.

7. Each Party shall provide the other with maps and other available information on the location of mine fields and other obstacles that can hamper or jeopardize movement within the territory and waters of Iraq.
Article 10
Contracting Procedures

The United States Forces may select contractors and enter into contracts in accordance with United States law for the purchase of materials and services in Iraq, including services of construction and building. The United States Forces shall contract with Iraqi suppliers of materials and services to the extent feasible when their bids are competitive and constitute best value. The United States Forces shall respect Iraqi law when contracting with Iraqi suppliers and contractors and shall provide Iraqi authorities with the names of Iraqi suppliers and contractors, and the amounts of relevant contracts.

Article 11
Services and Communications

1. The United States Forces may produce and provide water, electricity, and other services to agreed facilities and areas in coordination with the Iraqi authorities through the Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter.

2. The Government of Iraq owns all frequencies. Pertinent Iraqi authorities shall allocate to the United States Forces such frequencies as coordinated by both Parties through the JMOCC. The United States Forces shall return frequencies allocated to them at the end of their use not later than the termination of this Agreement.

3. The United States Forces shall operate their own telecommunications systems in a manner that fully respects the Constitution and laws of Iraq and in accordance with the definition of the term “telecommunications” contained in the Constitution of the International Union of Telecommunications of 1992, including the right to use necessary means and services of their own systems to ensure the full capability to operate systems of telecommunications.

4. For the purposes of this Agreement, the United States Forces are exempt from the payment of fees to use transmission airwaves and existing and future frequencies, including any administrative fees or any other related charges.

5. The United States Forces must obtain the consent of the Government of
Iraq regarding any projects of infrastructure for communications that are made outside agreed facilities and areas exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement in accordance with Article 4, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.

6. The United States Forces shall use telecommunications systems exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement.

Article 12
Jurisdiction

Recognizing Iraq’s sovereign right to determine and enforce the rules of criminal and civil law in its territory, in light of Iraq’s request for temporary assistance from the United States Forces set forth in Article 4, and consistent with the duty of the members of the United States Forces and the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions, the Parties have agreed as follows:

1. Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for the grave premeditated felonies enumerated pursuant to paragraph 8, when such crimes are committed outside agreed facilities and areas and outside duty status.

2. Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.

3. The United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas; during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas; and in circumstances not covered by paragraph 1.

4. At the request of either Party, the Parties shall assist each other in the investigation of incidents and the collection and exchange of evidence to ensure the due course of justice.

5. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities shall be notified immediately to United States Forces authorities and handed over to them within 24 hours.
from the time of detention or arrest. Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, custody of an accused member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component shall reside with United States Forces authorities. United States Forces authorities shall make such accused persons available to the Iraqi authorities for purposes of investigation and trial.

6. The authorities of either Party may request the authorities of the other Party to waive its primary right to jurisdiction in a particular case. The Government of Iraq agrees to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 1 above, only after it has determined and notified the United States in writing within 21 days of the discovery of an alleged offense, that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be exercised.

7. Where the United States exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Where the offense arising under paragraph 3 of this Article may involve a victim who is not a member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component, the Parties shall establish procedures through the Joint Committee to keep such persons informed as appropriate of: the status of the investigation of the crime; the bringing of charges against a suspected offender; the scheduling of court proceedings and the results of plea negotiations; opportunity to be heard at public sentencing proceedings, and to confer with the attorney for the prosecution in the case; and, assistance with filing a claim under Article 21 of this Agreement. As mutually agreed by the Parties, United States Forces authorities shall seek to hold the trials of such cases inside Iraq. If the trial of such cases is to be conducted in the United States, efforts will be undertaken to facilitate the personal attendance of the victim at the trial.

8. Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections consistent with those available under United States and Iraqi law. The Joint Committee shall establish procedures and mechanisms for implementing this Article, including an enumeration of the grave premeditated felonies that are subject to paragraph 1 and procedures that meet such due process standards and protections. Any exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article may proceed only in accordance with these procedures and mechanisms.

9. Pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, United States Forces authorities shall certify whether an alleged offense arose during duty status. In those cases where Iraqi authorities believe the circumstances require a review of this determination, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee, and United States Forces authorities shall take full account of the facts and circumstances and any information Iraqi authorities may present bearing on the determination by United States Forces authorities.

10. The Parties shall review the provisions of this Article every 6 months including by considering any proposed amendments to this Article taking into account the security situation in Iraq, the extent to which the United States Forces in Iraq are engaged in military operations, the growth and development of the Iraqi judicial system, and changes in United States and Iraqi law.

Article 13
Carrying Weapons and Apparel

Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may possess and carry weapons that are owned by the United States while in Iraq according to the authority granted to them under orders and according to their requirements and duties. Members of the United States Forces may also wear uniforms during duty in Iraq.

Article 14
Entry and Exit

1. For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through official places of embarkation and debarkation requiring only identification cards and travel orders issued for them by the United States. The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process of verification to be carried out by pertinent Iraqi authorities.
2. Iraqi authorities shall have the right to inspect and verify the lists of names of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component entering and leaving Iraq directly through the agreed facilities and areas. Said lists shall be submitted to Iraqi authorities by the United States Forces. For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through agreed facilities and areas requiring only identification cards issued for them by the United States. The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process for inspecting and verifying the validity of these documents.

**Article 15**

*Import and Export*

1. For the exclusive purposes of implementing this Agreement, the United States Forces and United States contractors may import, export (items bought in Iraq), re-export, transport, and use in Iraq any equipment, supplies, materials, and technology, provided that the materials imported or brought in by them are not banned in Iraq as of the date this Agreement enters into force. The importation, re-exportation, transportation, and use of such items shall not be subject to any inspections, licenses, or other restrictions, taxes, customs duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10. United States Forces authorities shall provide to relevant Iraqi authorities an appropriate certification that such items are being imported by the United States Forces or United States contractors for use by the United States Forces exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement. Based on security information that becomes available, Iraqi authorities have the right to request the United States Forces to open in their presence any container in which such items are being imported in order to verify its contents. In making such a request, Iraqi authorities shall honor the security requirements of the United States Forces and, if requested to do so by the United States Forces, shall make such verifications in facilities used by the United States Forces. The exportation of Iraqi goods by the United States Forces and United States contractors shall not be subject to inspections or any restrictions other than licensing requirements. The Joint Committee shall work with the Iraqi Ministry of Trade to expedite license requirements consistent with Iraqi law for the export of goods purchased in Iraq by the United States Forces for the purposes of this Agreement. Iraq has the right to demand review of any issues arising out of this paragraph. The Parties
shall consult immediately in such cases through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee.

2. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may import into Iraq, re-export, and use personal effect materials and equipment for consumption or personal use. The import into, re-export from, transfer from, and use of such imported items in Iraq shall not be subjected to licenses, other restrictions, taxes, custom duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10. The imported quantities shall be reasonable and proportionate to personal use. United States Forces authorities will take measures to ensure that no items or material of cultural or historic significance to Iraq are being exported.

3. Any inspections of materials pursuant to paragraph 2 by Iraqi authorities must be done urgently in an agreed upon place and according to procedures established by the Joint Committee.

4. Any material imported free of customs and fees in accordance with this Agreement shall be subjected to taxes and customs and fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, or any other fees valued at the time of sale in Iraq, upon sale to individuals and entities not covered by tax exemption or special import privileges. Such taxes and fees (including custom duties) shall be paid by the transferee for the items sold.

5. Materials referred to in the paragraphs of this Article must not be imported or used for commercial purposes.

Article 16
Taxes

1. Any taxes, duties, or fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, with their value determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, shall not be imposed on goods and services purchased by or on behalf of the United States Forces in Iraq for official use or on goods and services that have been purchased in Iraq on behalf of the United States Forces.

2. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall not be responsible for payment of any tax, duty, or fee that has its value
determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, unless in return for services requested and received.

Article 17
Licenses or Permits

1. Valid driver's licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities. Such license holders shall not be subject to a test or fee for operating the vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to the United States Forces in Iraq.

2. Valid driver's licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, to operate personal cars within the territory of Iraq shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities. License holders shall not be subject to a test or fee.

3. All professional licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees shall be deemed valid by Iraqi authorities, provided such licenses are related to the services they provide within the framework of performing their official duties for or contracts in support of the United States Forces, members of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees, according to terms agreed upon by the Parties.

Article 18
Official and Military Vehicles

1. Official vehicles shall display official Iraqi license plates to be agreed upon between the Parties. Iraqi authorities shall, at the request of the authorities of the United States Forces, issue registration plates for official vehicles of the United States Forces without fees, according to procedures used for the Iraqi Armed Forces. The authorities of the United States Forces shall pay to Iraqi authorities the cost of such plates.

2. Valid registration and licenses issued by United States authorities for
official vehicles of the United States Forces shall be deemed acceptable by
Iraqi authorities.

3. Military vehicles exclusively used by the United States Forces will be
exempted from the requirements of registration and licenses, and they shall
be clearly marked with numbers on such vehicles.

Article 19
Support Activities Services

1. The United States Forces, or others acting on behalf of the United States
Forces, may assume the duties of establishing and administering activities
and entities inside agreed facilities and areas, through which they can
provide services for members of the United States Forces, the civilian
component, United States contractors, and United States contractor
employees. These entities and activities include military post offices;
financial services; shops selling food items, medicine, and other
commodities and services; and various areas to provide entertainment and
telecommunications services, including radio broadcasts. The establishment
of such services does not require permits.

2. Broadcasting, media, and entertainment services that reach beyond the
scope of the agreed facilities and areas shall be subject to Iraqi laws.

3. Access to the Support Activities Services shall be limited to members of
the United States Forces and of the civilian component, United States
contractors, United States contractor employees, and other persons and
entities that are agreed upon. The authorities of the United States Forces
shall take appropriate actions to prevent misuse of the services provided by
the mentioned activities, and prevent the sale or resale of aforementioned
goods and services to persons not authorized access to these entities or to
benefit from their services. The United States Forces will determine
broadcasting and television programs to authorized recipients.

4. The service support entities and activities referred to in this Article shall
be granted the same financial and customs exemptions granted to the United
States Forces, including exemptions guaranteed in Articles 15 and 16 of this
Agreement. These entities and activities that offer services shall be operated
and managed in accordance with United States regulations; these entities and
activities shall not be obligated to collect nor pay taxes or other fees related to the activities in connection with their operations.

5. The mail sent through the military post service shall be certified by United States Forces authorities and shall be exempt from inspection, search, and seizure by Iraqi authorities, except for non-official mail that may be subject to electronic observation. Questions arising in the course of implementation of this paragraph shall be addressed by the concerned Joint Sub-Committee and resolved by mutual agreement. The concerned Joint Sub-Committee shall periodically inspect the mechanisms by which the United States Forces authorities certify military mail.

**Article 20**

**Currency and foreign exchange**

1. The United States Forces shall have the right to use any amount of cash in United States currency or financial instruments with a designated value in United States currency exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement. Use of Iraqi currency and special banks by the United States Forces shall be in accordance with Iraqi laws.

2. The United States Forces may not export Iraqi currency from Iraq, and shall take measures to ensure that members of the United States Forces, of the civilian component, and United States contractors and United States contractor employees do not export Iraqi currency from Iraq.

**Article 21**

**Claims**

1. With the exception of claims arising from contracts, each Party shall waive the right to claim compensation against the other Party for any damage, loss, or destruction of property, or compensation for injuries or deaths that could happen to members of the force or civilian component of either Party arising out of the performance of their official duties in Iraq.

2. United States Forces authorities shall pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious third party claims arising out of acts, omissions, or negligence of members of the United States Forces and of
the civilian component done in the performance of their official duties and incident to the non-combat activities of the United States Forces. United States Forces authorities may also settle meritorious claims not arising from the performance of official duties. All claims in this paragraph shall be settled expeditiously in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States. In settling claims, United States Forces authorities shall take into account any report of investigation or opinion regarding liability or amount of damages issued by Iraqi authorities.

3. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee, where issues referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above require review.

**Article 22**

**Detention**

1. No detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4.

2. In the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as authorized by this Agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest.

3. The Iraqi authorities may request assistance from the United States Forces in detaining or arresting wanted individuals.

4. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the United States Forces shall provide to the Government of Iraq available information on all detainees who are being held by them. Competent Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for persons who are wanted by them. The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all the remaining detainees in a safe and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement.
5. The United States Forces may not search houses or other real estate properties except by order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full coordination with the Government of Iraq, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.

Article 23
Implementation

Implementation of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation and application thereof shall be vested in the following bodies:

1. A Joint Ministerial Committee shall be established with participation at the Ministerial level determined by both Parties. The Joint Ministerial Committee shall deal with issues that are fundamental to the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement.

2. The Joint Ministerial Committee shall establish a JMOCC consisting of representatives from both Parties. The JMOCC shall be co-chaired by representatives of each Party.

3. The Joint Ministerial Committee shall also establish a Joint Committee consisting of representatives to be determined by both Parties. The Joint Committee shall be co-chaired by representatives of each Party, and shall deal with all issues related to this Agreement outside the exclusive competence of the JMOCC.

4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the Joint Committee shall establish Joint Sub-Committees in different areas to consider the issues arising under this Agreement according to their competencies.

Article 24
Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq
Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:

1. All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.

2. All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009.

3. United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall be stationed in the agreed facilities and areas outside cities, villages, and localities to be designated by the JMOCC before the date established in paragraph 2 above.

4. The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time. The Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.

5. The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.

**Article 25**

**Measures to Terminate the Application of Chapter VII to Iraq**

Acknowledging the right of the Government of Iraq not to request renewal of the Chapter VII authorization for and mandate of the multinational forces contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007) that ends on December 31, 2008;

Taking note of the letters to the UN Security Council from the Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary of State of the United States dated
December 7 and December 10, 2007, respectively, which are annexed to Resolution 1790;

Taking note of section 3 of the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship, signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iraq on November 26, 2007, which memorialized Iraq's call for extension of the above-mentioned mandate for a final period, to end not later than December 31, 2008:

Recognizing also the dramatic and positive developments in Iraq, and noting that the situation in Iraq is fundamentally different than that which existed when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 in 1990, and in particular that the threat to international peace and security posed by the Government of Iraq no longer exists, the Parties affirm in this regard that with the termination on December 31, 2008 of the Chapter VII mandate and authorization for the multinational force contained in Resolution 1790, Iraq should return to the legal and international standing that it enjoyed prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), and that the United States shall use its best efforts to help Iraq take the steps necessary to achieve this by December 31, 2008.

Article 26
Iraqi Assets

1. To enable Iraq to continue to develop its national economy through the rehabilitation of its economic infrastructure, as well as providing necessary essential services to the Iraqi people, and to continue to safeguard Iraq's revenues from oil and gas and other Iraqi resources and its financial and economic assets located abroad, including the Development Fund for Iraq, the United States shall ensure maximum efforts to:

   a. Support Iraq to obtain forgiveness of international debt resulting from the policies of the former regime.

   b. Support Iraq to achieve a comprehensive and final resolution of outstanding reparation claims inherited from the previous regime, including compensation requirements imposed by the UN Security Council on Iraq.
2. Recognizing and understanding Iraq's concern with claims based on actions perpetrated by the former regime, the President of the United States has exercised his authority to protect from United States judicial process the Development Fund for Iraq and certain other property in which Iraq has an interest. The United States shall remain fully and actively engaged with the Government of Iraq with respect to continuation of such protections and with respect to such claims.

3. Consistent with a letter from the President of the United States to be sent to the Prime Minister of Iraq, the United States remains committed to assist Iraq in connection with its request that the UN Security Council extend the protections and other arrangements established in Resolution 1483 (2003) and Resolution 1546 (2003) for petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq, proceeds and obligations from sale thereof, and the Development Fund for Iraq.

**Article 27**

**Deterrence of Security Threats**

In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability, the Parties shall work actively to strengthen the political and military capabilities of the Republic of Iraq to deter threats against its sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and its constitutional federal democratic system. To that end, the Parties agree as follows:

1. In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq that would violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its elected institutions, and upon request by the Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and, as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat.

2. The Parties agree to continue close cooperation in strengthening and maintaining military and security institutions and democratic political institutions in Iraq, including, as may be mutually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces, in order
to combat domestic and international terrorism and outlaw groups, upon request by the Government of Iraq.

3. Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.

Article 28
The Green Zone

Upon entry into force of this Agreement the Government of Iraq shall have full responsibility for the Green Zone. The Government of Iraq may request from the United States Forces limited and temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of security for the Green Zone. Upon such request, relevant Iraqi authorities shall work jointly with the United States Forces authorities on security for the Green Zone during the period determined by the Government of Iraq.

Article 29
Implementing Mechanisms

Whenever the need arises, the Parties shall establish appropriate mechanisms for implementation of Articles of this Agreement, including those that do not contain specific implementation mechanisms.
Article 30
The Period for which the Agreement is Effective

1. This Agreement shall be effective for a period of three years, unless terminated sooner by either Party pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. This Agreement shall be amended only with the official agreement of the Parties in writing and in accordance with the constitutional procedures in effect in both countries.

3. This Agreement shall terminate one year after a Party provides written notification to the other Party to that effect.

4. This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 2009, following an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that the actions by the Parties necessary to bring the Agreement into force in accordance with each Party's respective constitutional procedures have been completed.

Signed in duplicate in Baghdad on this 17th day of November, 2008, in the English and Arabic languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

[Signature]

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ:

[Signature]